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Do Analysts and Investors Efficiently Respond to Managerial 
Linguistic Complexity on Conference Calls? 
 
 
Abstract: This paper examines whether analysts and investors efficiently incorporate the 
informational cues from managerial linguistic complexity (e.g. Fog) on conference calls into their 
forecasts and trading decisions. We predict that managers use linguistic complexity to obfuscate 
before poor future earnings growth, but use linguistic complexity to provide informative disclosure 
before good future earnings growth. We find that the obfuscation (information) component of 
managerial Fog on a conference call is negatively (positively) associated with future earnings 
growth, and that the relations are generally stronger when there is a higher potential for earnings 
management during the period. We find that analyst forecast revisions efficiently respond to these 
informational signals in managerial Fog. However, while stock returns around the call are 
negatively associated with obfuscatory Fog, they are unrelated to informative Fog, which leads to 
a delayed positive return reaction to informative Fog after the call. Thus, while both analysts and 
investors appear to process the negative signal of managerial obfuscation, only analysts correctly 
interpret the positive signal of greater linguistic complexity due to more informative disclosure.
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Prior work finds that greater linguistic complexity (e.g., Fog) in corporate disclosures has 
a detrimental impact on sell-side analysts’ ability to process the information in such disclosures 
(e.g., Lehavy, Li, and Merkley 2011; Bozanic and Thevenot 2015). Such complexity also dissuades 
some investors from actively responding to the disclosure (e.g., Miller 2010; Lundholm, Rogo, 
and Zhang 2014). Much of this work relies on “one-way” corporate disclosures like SEC filings 
and press releases. Interactive disclosures, like earnings conference calls, provide analysts the 
opportunity to ask questions to management, and for investors to listen to the discussion in real 
time. Mayew, Sharp, and Venkatachalam (2013) find that analysts participating in a call issue more 
accurate earnings forecasts, but they find limited evidence that such superior forecasting ability is 
due to information received during the call. Part of the challenge for analysts and investors is that 
managers may have incentives to obfuscate during calls to hide the companies’ true performance.  
Recent work by Bushee, Gow, and Taylor (2018) finds that, when managers use linguistic 
complexity to obfuscate, information asymmetry increases, whereas when they use complexity to 
provide more informative disclosure, there is a decrease in information asymmetry. While this 
evidence indicates that linguistic complexity affects the perceived informativeness of the call, it 
also suggests that managerial linguistic complexity could provide a signal of the manager’s private 
information about expected future performance; i.e., managers use obfuscatory (informative) 
complexity when they expect poor (good) future performance. In this paper, we examine whether 
analysts and investors efficiently incorporate the informational cues from managerial linguistic 
complexity on conference calls into their decisions.  
We also examine whether such cues are more important when there is greater uncertainty 
about earnings quality. Prior work finds that analysts have mixed success in assessing earnings 
quality when firms have potentially managed earnings; e.g., when firms have high discretionary 
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accruals or just meet-or-beat forecasts (e.g., Bradshaw, Richardson, and Sloan 2001; Burghstahler 
and Eames 2003). In their survey of sell-side analysts, Brown, Call, Clement, and Sharp (2015) 
find the many analysts in interviews responded that “they exert little effort trying to determine 
whether firms misreport earnings” and the authors conclude that “sell-side analysts are unlikely to 
have incentives to try to uncover firm-specific financial misrepresentation” (p. 24). However, in 
contrast to the costs in time and effort of analyzing a 10-K to detect misreporting, it would be fairly 
low-cost for analysts (and investors) to use linguistic complexity cues on conference calls to infer 
whether managers are trying to obfuscate or to clarify the true nature of the company’s 
performance. The benefits of such an analysis would certainly outweigh the costs when there is 
uncertainty about the quality of the earnings news. Thus, we test whether analysts and investors 
are more likely to respond to linguistic cues when there is potential earnings management. 
We analyze a sample of almost 30,000 conference calls between 2006 and 2016. We 
measure the complexity of the language on the call using the Gunning (1952) Fog index. Following 
Bushee, et al. (2018), we use the Fog of analysts’ questions during the call and a number of 
business complexity variables to decompose the Fog of the manager’s language into an 
information component and an obfuscation component. The information component reflects the 
managers’ disclosure response to business complexity in the absence of obfuscation (e.g., 
informative technical disclosure), whereas the obfuscation component reflects linguistic 
complexity intended to reduce the informativeness of the call. The information component is a 
fitted value whose variation largely stems from variation in the Fog of analysts language. We 
assume that managers wishing to provide more information content will engage with analysts, 
encouraging them to continue to ask complex questions, whereas managers wishing to provide less 
information will not engage, and analysts will ask less complex questions. This assumption is 
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supported by Rennekamp, Sethuraman, and Steenhoven (2019), who find that greater engagement 
between analysts and managers on conference calls leads to more informative calls. 
We test whether the linguistic cues provided by the information and obfuscation 
components of Fog are associated with future earnings growth, analysts’ forecast revisions, and 
stock return reactions during and after the call. In each analysis, we control for the earnings surprise, 
other linguistic attributes of the manager’s language (e.g., tone, forward-looking statements), the 
issuance of guidance, and firm fixed-effects. Thus, any significant results for the components of 
Fog can be interpreted as linguistic complexity providing an informative signal about manager’s 
private information that is incremental to the current earnings news, other language features, and 
any inherent managerial linguistic style. 
First, we hypothesize that the components of Fog provide a signal about future earnings 
growth. We find that the information component of Fog is positively associated with next year’s 
earnings growth, while the obfuscation component is negatively associated with future earnings 
growth. This latter result confirms the Lee (2016) finding that “scripting” by managers to avoid 
answering questions is predictive of lower future earnings growth. We find that obfuscation Fog 
provides a similar negative signal, but we also find the new result that the manager’s decision to 
provide informative disclosure through higher linguistic complexity is a positive signal about 
future earnings. In addition, we find that these relations are significantly stronger when there is a 
higher potential for earnings management (e.g., income-increasing accruals and just meet-or-beat 
target). Thus, managerial linguistic complexity provides an important signal of expected future 
earnings, especially when there is greater uncertainty about the quality of earnings. 
Given these findings, we hypothesize that analysts will revise their forecasts of subsequent 
annual earnings downward when they perceive the manager is using high Fog to obfuscate. 
Similarly, when the manager uses high Fog to provide more informative disclosure, analysts 
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should infer a positive signal about future earnings, leading to an upward revision in annual 
earnings forecasts.1 Consistent with our predictions, we find that the obfuscation (information) 
component of Fog is negatively (positively) associated with forecast revisions around the call. We 
also find that the Fog components have a stronger association with analyst forecast revisions when 
earnings quality is unclear. Thus, analysts efficiently use the informational cues in managerial Fog 
as an incremental signal of future earnings news when revising their forecasts of annual earnings.  
We also hypothesize that investors listening to the call will pick up the informational cues 
in Fog, leading to a positive (negative) association between the information (obfuscation) 
component of Fog and three-day stock returns (CAR) during the call window. We find that the 
CAR is significantly negatively related to the obfuscation component, consistent with the Lee 
(2016) and Suslava (2017) findings of negative returns related to the use of scripting and 
euphemisms, respectively, to hide poor performance on calls. However, we do not find a 
significant association between CAR and the information component. When we interact the Fog 
components with the indicators for potential earnings management, none of the interaction terms 
are significant, indicating that investors do not place more weight on linguistic complexity signals 
when there is potential earnings management. Thus, while both investors and analysts appear to 
process the cues in managerial obfuscation, only analysts correctly interpret the signal of greater 
linguistic complexity due to more informative disclosure.  
  The finding that investors do not immediately react to the positive signal of informative 
linguistic complexity raises the question of whether there is a delayed price reaction until investors 
get additional information (such as the updated analyst forecasts). We examine post-call stock 
returns (POST_CAR), defined as cumulative abnormal returns from two days after the conference 
                                                            
1 While a more informative disclosure, in general, could produce good news or bad news, we expect to see more 
good news in this setting if managers strategically use linguistic complexity to provide more information when 
expected future earnings growth is positive, and to obfuscate when expected earnings growth is lower.  
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call to the day after the next quarter’s earnings announcement. We find that the obfuscation 
component is not significantly associated with POST_CAR, suggesting that investors completely 
impound the information in these signals in the conference call window. This finding is different 
from Lee (2016) and Suslava (2017), who both find delayed price reactions to scripting and 
euphemisms, respectively. Thus, the results suggest that obfuscating linguistic complexity is a 
clearer negative signal for investors than scripting and euphemisms.  
 We also find that POST_CAR is significantly positively associated with the information 
component, showing that there is a delayed price reaction to the positive signal in informative Fog. 
Moreover, the interactions between the Fog components and the indicators for potential earnings 
management are generally significant, consistent with investors under-reacting to the signals when 
earnings quality is uncertain. We find that these delayed reactions are triggered by the first analyst 
reports after the call window. Overall, these results indicate that investors immediately recognize 
linguistic complexity used to obfuscate, but do not immediately react to the positive signal of 
informative Fog or to the importance of the signals when there is potential earnings management. 
Analysts have a comparative advantage in reacting to these signals because they get to ask the 
questions, and can thus make an immediate assessment of whether the manager is trying to provide 
more information. Lacking this access, investors seem more uncertain about the implications of 
informative linguistic complexity, and do not fully react until after the call window when updated 
analyst forecasts becomes available.  
In additional analyses, we find that, among managers who provide earnings guidance, 
managers providing more information on the call also provide more precise guidance, whereas 
managers obfuscating in their responses to analyst questions tend to provide less precise guidance. 
This finding suggests that managers act consistently across their guidance and call disclosure 
decisions in signaling future earnings. We also find that a higher information (obfuscation) 
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component of Fog is associated with an improvement (reduction) in forecast accuracy and a 
reduction (improvement) in forecast dispersion. Thus, while analysts correctly interpret 
obfuscation as bad news, the lack of informative disclosure reduces the accuracy of the consensus 
forecast and leads to more disagreement among analysts. Finally, we find that short-term-oriented 
“transient” institutional investors increase (decrease) their holdings in response to higher 
information (obfuscation) components of Fog, whereas long-term-oriented investors (i.e., 
dedicated and quasi-indexer institutions) do not respond to linguistic complexity during the call. 
Thus, transient investors facilitate impounding the information in linguistic cues into price. 
Our paper contributes to the literature by finding evidence that analysts not only correctly 
interpret the linguistic cues in Fog, but they rely more strongly on those cues when earnings 
management is more likely. Prior work finds that linguistic complexity has a detrimental impact 
on analyst forecasts and recommendations. We also find that investors immediately respond to 
Fog used to obfuscate, consistent with Lee (2016) and Suslava (2016), but unlike those papers, we 
do not find any delayed reaction to obfuscation Fog; investors appear to efficiently price this signal. 
Moreover, we find the new result that investors do not immediately respond to the positive signal 
in informative Fog, leading to a delayed price reaction. Thus, we conclude that analysts fulfill an 
important informational role by efficiently interpreting linguistic complexity into their forecasts. 
 
II. HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT AND RELATED RESEARCH 
Linguistic Complexity as a Signal of Future Earnings 
Prior work finds that managers use linguistic complexity in disclosures to obfuscate the 
true nature of the firm’s current and expected performance (see Loughran and McDonald 2016 for 
a review). Using the Gunning (1952) Fog Index to measure the linguistic complexity of 10-K 
filings, Li (2008) finds that firms with higher 10-K Fog have lower current earnings performance 
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and less persistent future earnings performance. Lo, Ramos, and Rogo (2017) find that firms that 
are most likely to have managed earnings to beat the prior year’s earnings have higher Fog in their 
MD&As, suggesting that obfuscation incentives for linguistic complexity are especially high in 
earnings management years. Filzen and Peterson (2015) also show that firms with more complex 
financial statements are more likely to just beat analyst expectations. 
However, recent work by Bushee, et al. (2018) suggests that linguistic complexity could 
be associated with more informative disclosure. Based on the assumption that analysts are unlikely 
to have obfuscation incentives when speaking during a conference call, Bushee, et al. (2018) use 
analyst linguistic complexity on the call to benchmark for the amount of linguistic complexity 
needed to understand the business. After decomposing managerial Fog on a conference call into a 
component that represents obfuscation and a component that represent informative technical 
disclosure, they find that the obfuscation (information) component of Fog is positively (negatively) 
associated with information asymmetry around the call. 
As the fitted value in the decomposition model, the information component largely varies 
based on variation in the linguistic complexity of the analysts’ language. Rennekamp, et al. (2019) 
use Linguistic Style Matching to measure the level of engagement between analysts and managers 
on calls. They find that greater engagement is associated with greater information content on the 
call. We rely on this finding to assume that managers wishing to provide more information content 
will engage with analysts, encouraging them to continue to ask complex questions, whereas 
managers wishing to provide less information will not engage, and analysts will ask less complex 
questions. Through this engagement mechanism, the Bushee, et al. (2018) information component 
measures the manager’s choice to provide more information during the call. 
Based on this prior work, we predict that a manager’s linguistic complexity on a conference 
call provides a signal of the manager’s private information about expected future earnings. Given 
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that managers tend to obfuscate in the 10-K when they report good earnings news that is transitory 
or bad earnings news that is persistent (Li 2008), we expect that managerial obfuscation during a 
conference call predicts lower earnings growth in the future. In contrast, Bushee, et al. (2018) finds 
that managers of some loss firms use linguistic complexity to provide more information. We expect 
that managers would be more likely to do so when they have bad earnings news that is expected 
to be transitory. Managers should also have incentives to be more informative about good earnings 
news that is expected to be persistent. Thus, we hypothesize the following: 
H1: Future earnings growth following conference calls is negatively (positively) associated with 
obfuscating (informative) managerial linguistic complexity on the call. 
 
Linguistic Complexity and Analyst Forecast Revisions  
Prior work finds that linguistic complexity in a firm’s disclosures affects the quality of 
analysts’ forecast outputs. Lehavy, et al. (2011) show that higher Fog in 10-Ks is associated with 
greater dispersion, lower accuracy, and greater overall uncertainty in analyst earnings forecasts. 
Using earnings press releases, Bozanic and Thevenot (2015) find that higher readability in the 
form of shorter sentences, textual similarity, and lexical diversity are associated with decreases in 
analysts' uncertainty. Filzen and Peterson (2015) find that analysts rely more on management 
guidance and are more likely to exclude items from non-GAAP earnings forecasts for firms with 
more complex financial statements. Thus, this work suggests that greater linguistic complexity in 
written disclosures has a detrimental impact on analysts’ ability to process information. 
In contrast, prior work suggests that conference calls, in general, increase analysts’ ability 
to forecast earnings accurately (Bowen, Davis, and Matsumoto 2002, Kimbrough 2005). Prior 
work also finds that analysts have incentives to acquire value-relevant information during 
conference calls (Mayew 2008; Matsumoto, Pronk, and Roelofsen 2011; Twedt and Rees 2012; 
Mayew, Sharp, and Venkatachalam 2013). Mayew, et al. (2013) find that analysts participating in 
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a call issue more accurate earnings forecasts after the call than nonparticipating analysts. They find 
limited evidence that the superior forecasting ability is due to information received during the call, 
suggesting that the participating analysts’ superior pre-call private information explains the results. 
Huang, Zang, and Rong (2014) find that analyst reports after conference calls are associated with 
a larger investor reaction when managers have incentives to withhold disclosure, but they do not 
look at whether the analysts’ forecasts efficiently process the information in the call. Finally, 
consistent with analysts detecting managerial incentives to hide information on calls, Lee (2016) 
finds that the amount of “scripting” in managerial responses to questions on conference calls is 
negatively associated with future earnings performance and with analyst forecast revisions.  
Based on the work suggesting that analysts efficiently process information in conference 
calls, we expect that analysts will efficiently process the informational cues in a manager’s 
linguistic complexity on the call. If analysts correctly perceive that managers use high linguistic 
complexity to obfuscate expected poor future performance, then analysts will revise downward 
their forecasts of annual earnings. Similarly, if analysts correctly perceive that managers use high 
linguistic complexity to provide more informative technical disclosure about expected positive 
future performance, then analysts will revise upward revision their annual earnings forecasts based 
on this signalNote that, with more informative disclosure, it is possible that analysts would learn 
bad news about the future and revise their forecasts downward. However, if we assume that, on 
average, managers with bad news have incentives to obfuscate, then informative disclosure should 
be more likely to be observed for good news.Thus, we hypothesize the following: 
H2: Analyst forecast revisions following conference calls are negatively (positively) associated 
with obfuscating (informative) managerial linguistic complexity on the call. 
 
 
 
10 
 
Linguistic Complexity and Investor Reactions  
Prior work finds that investors immediately react to any new information released during 
conference calls, especially during the Q&A portion (Bushee, Matsumoto, and Miller 2004; 
Matsumoto, Pronk, and Roelofsen 2011). Prior work also finds that investors react to linguistic 
cues during calls. Price et al. (2012) finds that the tone of the Q&A part of the call is positively 
associated with the stock return reaction to the call, both during the three-day window and over 
the next two months. Hollander, Pronk, and Roelofsen (2010) show that when managers avoid 
answering specific questions during a call, there is a negative stock return reaction to the call. Lee 
(2016) finds that calls with more “scripted” managerial responses to questions have negative stock 
returns during the call window and over the subsequent quarter. Similarly, Suslava (2017) finds 
that the greater use of “euphemisms” to soften bad news is associated with negative stock returns 
during the call and over the next quarter. These findings suggest that investors will react negatively 
to obfuscating linguistic complexity during the call.  
While Bushee, et al. (2018) find that the information component of linguistic complexity 
reduces information asymmetry, they do not test whether there is a positive return reaction to 
greater information. In general, more information could lead to either a greater positive or a greater 
negative return reaction depending on the nature of the information. However, if managers 
strategically provide more information when they expect higher earnings growth, then we expect 
such informative linguistic complexity to lead to a positive market reaction to the conference call. 
Thus, we hypothesize the following: 
 
H3: Stock returns in the three-day window around conference calls are negatively (positively) 
associated with obfuscating (informative) managerial linguistic complexity on the call. 
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Both the Lee (2016) and Suslava (2017) results suggest that, while investors do detect 
efforts to obfuscate during the call, they do not fully incorporate the information as there is a drift 
in negative returns after the call. Thus, we also examine whether investors efficiently react to the 
cues in linguistic complexity by testing whether the information or obfuscation components of 
linguistic complexity are associated with stock returns subsequent to the call. We do not provide 
any specific hypotheses for these tests; although based on prior work, we expect that any delayed 
reaction would be the result of under-reaction to the linguistic cues. Thus, subsequent returns 
would be negatively (positively) associated with obfuscating (informative) managerial linguistic 
complexity on the call. 
  
Interactive Effects of Linguistic Cues and Potential Earnings Management 
Prior work suggests that analysts have mixed success in detecting earnings management. 
Bradshaw, et al. (2001) find that analyst earnings forecasts do not incorporate the predictable future 
earnings declines associated with high abnormal accruals. Burghstahler and Eames (2003) find 
evidence that that analysts anticipate earnings management to avoid small losses and small 
earnings decreases, but that analysts often predict earnings management that is not realized 
(leading to forecast optimism at zero earnings forecasts) and fail to predict earnings management 
that is realized (leading to forecast pessimism at zero earnings realizations). Abarbanell and 
Lehavy (2003) conclude, “analysts either cannot anticipate or are not motivated to anticipate 
completely in their forecasts firms’ efforts to manage earnings.” In a survey of sell-side analysts, 
Brown, et al. (2015) report that analysts tend to not look for misreporting in the SEC filings, but 
they do try to determine whether the earnings are sustainable and reflect economic reality.2  
                                                            
2 Coles, Hertzel, and Kalpathy (2006) find that, when earnings management is fairly transparent (e.g., abnormally 
low discretionary accruals between cancellations and reissuances of stock options), analysts are able to see through 
earnings management. 
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Analysts and investors face a greater challenge in assessing the persistence of earnings 
news when the quality of earnings is more difficult to determine, such as when the earnings have 
a small cash component or when they are close to a target. In these cases, there is a higher 
probability that managers have manipulated earnings to meet a target, which means that analysts 
and investors have to assess the legitimacy of the current earnings news in addition to its 
implications for future earnings. On the other hand, Dechow, Richardson, and Tuna (2003) suggest 
that earnings that just meet-or-beat a target are not always an indicator of earnings management, 
as there are economic and regulatory reasons that could explain the discontinuity in earnings 
changes around zero. Similarly, high discretionary accruals could represent legitimate earnings if 
there is a change in the firm’s economics in the given period. Thus, for firms with high 
discretionary accruals or that just meet-or-beat an earnings target, there is higher uncertainty about 
the quality of the earnings news (and the credibility of managers). Due to this uncertainty, 
managers likely have stronger incentives to obfuscate when they have managed earnings, and they 
have stronger incentives to provide more information when they have high-quality earnings that 
appear to be potentially managed. Consequently, we expect that any signal about obfuscation or 
informative disclosure present in high linguistic complexity will carry more weight for firms with 
uncertain earnings quality: 
H4: The associations between linguistic complexity and future earnings, analyst forecast 
revisions, and stock return reactions are stronger when the potential for earnings management is 
high (e.g., income-increasing discretionary accruals, meet-or-beat earnings target). 
 
 
 
III. RESEARCH DESIGN 
Informative versus Obfuscating Linguistic Complexity  
We develop measures for the obfuscation and information components of managerial 
linguistic complexity on conference calls following the approach of Bushee, et al. (2018). They 
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use the linguistic complexity of analysts on the call, as well as a set of firm characteristics, to 
provide a benchmark for the level of complex language needed to understand the business. This 
expected level of managerial linguistic complexity is called the “information component;” i.e., the 
intrinsic amount of informative technical disclosure provided by managers on the conference call. 
The unexpected level of managerial linguistic complexity is called the “obfuscation component;” 
i.e., complex language that is likely intended to reduce the understandability of disclosure.  
We construct our sample using conference call transcripts from SeekingAlpha.com; analyst 
and management forecasts from I/B/E/S; and stock returns and financial statement data from CRSP 
and Compustat. We begin the sample in 2006 when conference call transcripts become well-
populated on SeekingAlpha.com and conclude in 2016. The sample consists of 71,648 firm-
quarters with conference call transcripts and the necessary CRSP, Compustat, and I/B/E/S data.  
We measure linguistic complexity using the Gunning (1952) Fog index for the managerial 
presentation and the question and answer (Q&A) portions of the call separately. The Fog index 
measures linguistic complexity as a function of the number of words per sentence and the percent 
of complex words, where complex words are those words with more than two syllables: 
Fog(.) = 0.4 × (average number of words per sentence + percent of complex words) (1) 
 To provide a benchmark for the expected amount of linguistic complexity needed to 
understand the business, we estimate the following regression from Bushee, et al. (2018):  
Fog(Manager) = β0 + β1Fog(Analyst) + ∑βiBusiness Complexity Variables+ e (2) 
where Fog(Manager) is one of the two managerial Fog indexes, Fog(Present) or Fog(Response). 
Fog(Present) is the Fog of managers’ language during the presentation portion of the call and Fog 
(Response) is Fog of the managers’ responses in the Q&A. Fog(Analyst) is the Fog of analysts’ 
language during the Q&A. The business complexity variables include market value of equity (Size); 
debt-to-assets ratio (Leverage); book-to-market ratio (BM); quarterly buy-and-hold stock returns 
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(Returns); total acquisitions during the quarter (Acquisitions); PP&E-to-assets ratio (CapIntensity); 
capital expenditures (Capex); research and development (R&D); debt and equity issuance 
(Financing); cash flow volatility (σCFO); goodwill impairments (Goodwill); and restructuring 
charges (Restructuring) (Bushee, et al. 2018). All variables are defined in the Appendix.  
The regression results for Equation (2) are reported in Panel A of Table 1. We rank all of 
the variables into deciles and scale them to range from 0 to 1. The magnitude and significance of 
our coefficients are comparable with Bushee et al. (2018). Using these coefficients, we decompose 
managerial linguistic complexity into information and obfuscation components. The information 
components, Info(Present) and Info(Response), are measured as the fitted value from these 
coefficients in columns (1) and (2), respectively. These components capture managerial linguistic 
complexity that is driven by analyst linguistic complexity and business complexity. The 
obfuscation components, Obfu(Present) and Obfu(Response), are measured as the residual value 
from the model in columns (1) and (2), respectively. These components capture managerial 
linguistic complexity uncorrelated with analyst complexity and business complexity.  
  Panel B of Table 1 reports descriptive statistics for our estimates of these components. The 
means of Obfu(Present) and Obfu(Response) are zero by construction because they are regression 
residuals. The standard deviation of Obfu(Present) (Obfu(Response)) is 1.455 (1.499). The mean 
Info(Present) is 16.116 and the mean Info(Response) is 12.708; the magnitude of these components 
is large because they include the intercept. Because Info(Present) and Info(Response) are highly 
correlated, we combine them into a single variable, Info(Both), using the first principle component 
of the two variables (Bushee, et al. 2018). As this analysis standardizes the variables, the mean of 
Info(Both) is zero. 
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Regressions for the Main Tests  
 All of our main tests examine whether the components of managerial Fog provide a signal 
of manager’s private information about expected future earnings using the following regression:  
DV = β0 + β1Obfu(Present) + β2Obfu(Response) + β3Info(Both) + βiCONTROLS + Firm 
Fixed Effects + ε        (3) 
 
where DV = GROWTHt+1, AF_REV, CAR, POST_CAR 
For each DV, we expect β1 and β2 to be negative due to the hypothesized negative relation 
between obfuscation and expected future performance. We expect β3 to be positive due to the 
hypothesized positive relation between informative disclosures and expected future performance.  
 We measure the dependent variables as follows. Next year’s earnings growth, GROWTHt+1, 
is operating income from year t+1 minus operating income in year t, scaled by total assets in year 
t and then multiplied by 100 (Lev and Nissim 2004; Huang et al. 2014). An analyst forecast 
revision, AF_REV, is defined the median analyst EPS forecast for year t+1 for all forecasts made 
within 30 days following the conference call (AFCpost) less the median consensus forecast of year 
t+1 directly before the conference call (AFCpre), divided by beginning-of-quarter price.3 The 
stock return reaction to the conference call, CAR, is the cumulative abnormal return for the three-
day window (-1, 1) around the conference call. Finally, the post-conference call stock return, 
POST_CAR, is the cumulative abnormal return over the period beginning on Day +2 after quarter 
t’s earnings announcement and ending on the Day +1 after the earnings announcement date for 
quarter t+1. Abnormal returns are measured as the raw daily return from the CRSP minus the return 
on the portfolio of firms in the same size and book-to-market deciles. 
                                                            
3 If there is more than one median consensus analyst forecast during the specified periods, AFCpre is the latest 
median consensus analyst forecast before the conference call date and AFCpost is the earliest median consensus 
analyst forecast after the conference call date. 
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 We control for a variety of firm characteristics throughout the analysis. First, we include 
the unexpected earnings surprise (UESURP) to measure the earnings news revealed in the earnings 
announcement. We define UESURP as the difference between actual EPS and the most recent 
median consensus analyst forecast prior to the call, scaled by beginning-of-quarter price (Kross, 
Ro, and Suk 2011; Kross and Suk 2012). We also include controls for firm size, growth, and 
performance, such as stock returns for the prior 12 months (RET), market value of equity (SIZE), 
book-to-market ratio (BM), and earnings performance (ROA). We control for analyst following 
(AFN) and the level of institutional ownership (INST_OWN) as proxies for firms’ external 
monitoring environment (Lang and Lundholm 1996; Kross, et al. 2011; Lehavy, et al. 2011). We 
also include a number of controls that are specific to certain regressions, such as the standard 
deviation of analyst forecasts prior to the conference call (AFSTD) (Ajinkya, Bhojraj, and 
Sengupta 2005), the lagged quarterly change in EPS from the prior year (∆LEPS) (Kross et al. 
2011), return volatility prior to the call (RET_VOL), and return momentum prior to the call 
(RET_MOM) (Mayew and Venkatachalam 2012 and Lee 2016). 
Finally, we include controls for a number of other textual attributes to ensure that our 
results reflect the effects of linguistic complexity. We measure the proportion of sentences 
containing forward-looking statements in the presentation and response parts of the call as 
FWDLOOK(Present) and FWDLOOK(Response), respectively (Li 2010 and Bozanic et al. 2018). 
We capture the tone of the call with the number of positive and negative words in the presentation 
and response parts of the call—POSTONE(Present), POSTONE(Response), NEGTONE(Present), 
NEGTONE(Response)—using the Loughran and McDonald (2011) dictionary. We also include an 
indicator variable that equals one if management guidance (GUIDANCE) is provided on the same 
day as the conference call; Billings, Jennings, and Lev (2015) report that over 80% of management 
forecasts are bundled with the earnings announcement in the post-Reg FD period. 
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All regressions are estimated with firm fixed effects and all continuous variables are 
winsorized at 1% in either tail of the distribution to remove the effects of outliers. We adjust the 
standard errors by clustering observations by firm and by date of conference calls. 
 
Interactions with Indicators for Potential Earnings Management 
 To test the interactive effects of linguistic complexity and potential earnings management, 
we estimate the following regressions:  
DV = β0 + β1Obfu(Present) + β2Obfu(Response) + β3Info(Both) + β4Obfu(Present)×EM 
+ β5 Obfu(Response)×EM + β6 Info(Both)×EM + β7EM + βiCONTROLS + 
Firm Fixed Effects + ε           (4)  
 
where DV = GROWTHt+1, AF_REV, ΔINST_OWN, CAR, POST_CAR 
The variables of interest in this regression are the interactions Obfu(Present)×EM, 
Obfu(Response)×EM, and Info(Both)×EM, where EM is one of the two proxies for potential 
earnings management: income-increasing discretionary accruals or meet-or-beat earnings. For all 
DV, we expect β4 and β5 (β6) to be negative (positive), capturing a stronger relation between 
obfuscating (informative) disclosure and expected future performance when the potential for 
earnings management is higher.  
Our first proxy for potential earnings management uses discretionary accruals. We define 
income-increasing discretionary accruals, II_DA =1, if the firm reports discretionary accruals that 
are positive; otherwise II_DA = 0. Discretionary accruals are estimated using an annual cross-
sectional model for each industry defined at the two-digit SIC level, using the population of firms 
on Compustat (and requiring at least 10 observations in each industry-year group).4 Discretionary 
                                                            
4 The annual period includes the quarter of the conference call, but we do not attempt to measure the amount of 
income-increasing discretionary accruals in that specific quarter’s earnings. Quarterly discretionary accruals can be 
noisier than annual models (Jeter and Shivakumar 1999), so we are trading off measuring the exact timing of the 
income-increasing accruals during the year to get a more precise measurement of income-increasing accruals. 
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accruals are calculated based on the Ball and Shivakumar (2006) model, including controlling for 
earnings performance Kothari, Leone, and Wasley (2005): 
AC = α + β1ΔR + β2PPE + β3CFO + β4DCFO + β5CFO × DCFO + β6ROA + ε (5) 
where AC is (cash flow from operations – income before extraordinary items)/average total 
assets; ΔR is (revenuet – revenuet-1)/average total assets; PPE is gross property, plant, and 
equipment/average total assets; CFO is cash flow from operations/average total assets; DCFO is 
an indicator variable equal to one if CFO is negative, and zero otherwise; and ROA is (net income 
before extraordinary items)/average total assets. The residuals from this estimation form the 
discretionary accruals.  
Our second proxy for potential earnings management is whether the firm just meet-or-beat 
its earnings target during the quarter (Burgstahler and Dichev 1997). We define the variable MBE 
= 1 if ΔEPS falls in the neighborhood from zero to three cents; otherwise MBE =0 (Lo, et al. 2017). 
 
IV. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
Summary Statistics  
Table 2 presents summary statistics for the sample used in the main tests. From our sample 
of 71,648 conference calls with the necessary data to estimate the Fog decomposition model, we 
lose 39,291 observations when we require at least three analysts issuing forecasts. We lose 
additional 2,676 observations for missing data on control variables from CRSP and Compustat. 
These data requirements result in a sample of 29,664 firm-quarter observations for our main tests.  
Table 2 shows that the mean (median) Obfu(Present) is -0.0638 (-0.0590) and the mean 
(median) Obfu(Response) is -0.0709 (-0.2368). The mean (median) Info(Both) is 0.0118 (-0.0698). 
The mean (median) analyst forecast revision (AF_REV) from before to after the conference call is 
0.0003 (0.0002). This suggests that, in general, analysts revise upward their forecasts of future 
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earnings following the conference calls. For the additional two test variables proxying for potential 
earnings management, the mean II_DA and MBE are 0.386 and 0.107, respectively. This suggests 
that about 39% of observations involve income-incoming discretionary accruals and 11% of them 
have just met or beat last year’s earnings by a small amount.  
 
Linguistic Complexity and Future Earnings Growth 
 We first examine whether a manager’s linguistic complexity on a conference call provides 
a signal about future earnings (Hypothesis 1). Table 3 reports the main results based on equation 
(3) with next year’s earnings growth as the dependent variable. Column (1) shows that 
Obfu(Present) and Obfu(Response) are both significantly negatively associated with next year’s 
earnings growth, indicating that managerial obfuscation is more likely before low future earnings 
growth. In contrast, the coefficient on Info(Both) is positive and significant, indicating more 
informative linguistic complexity is associated with higher earnings growth in the next year. These 
results confirm Hypothesis 1 in showing that managers’ decision to obfuscate or to inform through 
linguistic complexity provides a signal of next year’s earnings growth. 
 In columns (2) and (3), we report regressions with interactions between the obfuscation 
and information components of Fog and the proxies for earnings management (equation (4)). We 
find that the coefficients on the interaction terms are all significant in the expected direction, 
showing the relation between the Fog components and future earnings growth is stronger when 
earnings management is more likely, consistent with Hypothesis 4. Overall, these results suggest 
that managers are more likely to obfuscate (provide information) before higher (lower) expected 
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future earnings growth, indicating that linguistic complexity provides information about future 
earnings that is incremental to the earnings surprise and to other linguistic features, such as tone.5 
 
Analyst Forecast Revisions 
 Next, we test whether analysts efficiently process the informational cues in a manager’s 
linguistic complexity and revise their annual earnings forecasts accordingly. Table 4 reports the 
results from regressions of analyst forecast revisions on the obfuscation and information 
components of Fog and the control variables (equation (3)). Column (1) shows that the coefficients 
on Obfu(Present) and Obfu(Response) are negative and significant, suggesting that analysts revise 
downward their forecasts of future earnings following calls with greater obfuscation. In contrast, 
the coefficient on Info(Both) is positive and significant, indicating that analysts revise upward their 
forecasts of future earnings when the linguistic complexity represents a greater amount of 
information. Thus, consistent with Hypothesis 2, analysts use the cues from linguistic complexity 
on the calls to update their forecasts negatively (positively) when managers are obfuscating 
(providing more information).6  
Columns (2) and (3) provide tests of Hypothesis 4, in which we predict that the relation 
between linguistic complexity and forecast revisions will be stronger when there is a higher 
potential for earnings management. First, we note that there is no significant relation between 
                                                            
5 We also estimate the regression in equation (7) using earnings growth in year t+2 and in year t+3 (not tabled). As 
expected, the associations between the Fog components and future earnings growth dissipate over longer horizons. 
For growth in year t+2, the coefficients on Obfu(Present) and Info(Both) are both significant in the expected 
direction. For year t+3, only Obfu(Present) is still significantly associated with earnings growth. 
6 We also examine whether analyst forecast revisions are related to general linguistic complexity of managers. We 
find that the coefficient on Fog(Present) is negative and marginally significant (p-value = 0.053), consistent with 
managerial obfuscation, on average, in the presentation part of the call. However, the coefficient on Fog(Response) 
in insignificant. These results suggest that analysts do not tend to react to the general level of linguistic complexity 
in revising their forecasts; rather, they differentiate between “good” and “bad” linguistic complexity. 
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analyst forecast revisions and either II_DA or MBE.7 Thus, analysts do not systematically revise 
their forecasts downward (or upward) when there is potential earnings management. However, we 
find that the coefficients on the interactions between Obfu(Response) and both indicators for 
potential earnings management (II_DA and MBE, respectively) are negative and significant, 
consistent with Hypothesis 4. There is no significant interaction with Obfu(Present), suggesting 
that the analysts do not put more weight on obfuscation Fog in the presentation part of the call 
when earnings quality is unclear. The results also show that the coefficients on Info(Both)×EM are 
positive and significant in both the II_DA and MBE regressions, again consistent with Hypothesis 
4. Overall, the results in Table 4 indicate that analysts efficiently incorporate the cues from 
managerial linguistic complexity during conference calls into their forecasts, and they place more 
weight on those cues when the potential for earnings management is higher. 
 
Stock Returns around the Conference Call 
 Next, we examine whether market participants correctly interpret the informational cues in 
linguistic complexity when reacting to the information in the conference call. Table 5 presents the 
results of regressions of the 3-day cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) around the conference call 
date on the obfuscation and information components of Fog and the control variables (equation 
(3)). To be consistent with prior work, we replace UESURP with the scaled decile rank, DSUE, 
and find the expected significant positive relation between the earnings surprise and CAR. We also 
find that a greater number of positive tone words in the manager’s response (POSTONE(Response)) 
is positively associated with CAR, consistent with Price et al. (2012).  
                                                            
7 If we drop the linguistic complexity variables from the regression, the coefficients on II_DA and MBE remain 
insignificant. 
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 Column (1) shows that the coefficients on Obfu(Present) and Obfu(Response) are both 
negative and significant, suggesting that investors correctly interpret obfuscation Fog in the 
presentation and the Q&As as a negative signal about future earnings, consistent with Hypothesis 
3. However, the coefficient on Info(Both) is not significant, indicating that investors do not react 
to the potential positive signal about future earnings in more informative linguistic complexity. 
 Columns (2) and (3) present results for the interactions with the potential earnings 
management indicators. Other than a marginally significant coefficient on Obfu(Response)×EM, 
none of the interaction terms are significant, while the coefficients on the main effects for 
Obfu(Present) and Obfu(Response) generally remain negative and significant, indicating that 
investors do not place more weight on linguistic complexity signals when there is potential 
earnings management. There is a negative and significant coefficient on II_DA, suggesting that 
investors view high discretionary accruals as less persistent earnings; this reaction actually 
subsumes the coefficient on Obfu(Response).  
 Thus, while both investors and analysts appear to process the cues in managerial 
obfuscation, only analysts correctly interpret the positive signal of greater linguistic complexity 
due to more informative technical disclosure. In addition, only analysts place a larger weight on 
linguistic cues when the potential for earnings management is high. These results suggest that 
analysts fulfill an important informational role in efficiently incorporating linguistic complexity 
into their forecasts. 
 
Post-call Stock Returns 
 The finding that investors do not immediately react to the positive signal of informative 
linguistic complexity raises the question of whether there is a delayed price reaction. We examine 
post-call stock returns (POST_CAR), defined as cumulative abnormal returns from two days after 
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the call to the day after the next quarter’s earnings announcement. We estimate the regression in 
equation (3) using POST_CAR as the dependent variable and report the results in Table 6, Panel 
A. Column (1) shows that the coefficients on Obfu(Present) and Obfu(Response) are not 
significant, suggesting that investors completely impound the information in these signals in the 
conference call window. This finding differs from Lee (2016) and Suslava (2017), who both find 
delayed price reactions to scripting and euphemisms, respectively. Thus, the results suggest that 
obfuscating linguistic complexity is a clearer negative signal for investors than scripting and 
euphemisms.  
 Column (1) also shows the coefficient on Info(Both) is positive and significant. Thus, there 
is a delayed price reaction to the positive signal in informative linguistic complexity, consistent 
with investors missing the signal initially and then updating as more information, such as analyst 
forecast revisions, comes out after the call. 
 Columns (2) and (3) examine the interactions with potential earnings management. The 
coefficient on Obfu(Present) is negative and weakly significant in the regression with the high 
accruals interaction. Combined with Table 6, this result suggests that investors under-react to 
obfuscation for high accruals firms at the call date and update for the negative signal after the call. 
The coefficients on the Info(Both) interaction terms are positive and significant, consistent with 
the stronger positive signal about future earnings growth in informative linguistic complexity when 
there is a high potential for earnings management. Overall, these results indicate that investors do 
not efficiently process the positive signal of informative Fog at the time of the conference call, 
leading to a predictable delayed price reaction. 
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Stock Reactions to Analyst Forecasts Subsequent to the Call  
 The finding that investors have a delayed price reaction to the positive signal in informative 
linguistic complexity raises the question of whether analysts play an information intermediary role 
in guiding investors following the conference calls. We next examine market reactions to the initial 
analyst forecast subsequent to the conference call (CAR_AnalystReport), defined as three-day 
cumulative abnormal returns surrounding the first report issued by analysts after the call window. 
We estimate the regression in equation (3) using CAR_AnalystReport as the dependent variable 
and report the results in Panel B of Table 6. 
 Column (1) shows that the coefficients on Obfu(Present) and Obfu(Response) are both 
insignificant, consistent with the Panel A results that investors fully incorporate the negative signal 
in obfuscation Fog during the call window. In contrast, the coefficient on Info(Both) is positive 
and significant, indicating a price reaction to information Fog when the first analyst reports are 
issued after the call window. Columns (2) and (3) show positive and marginally significant 
coefficients on Info(Both)×EM in both the II_DA and MBE regressions, consistent with analyst 
reports guiding investors to place more weight on information cues when earnings quality is 
unclear. Combined with Table 5 and Panel A of Table 6, these results suggest that investors 
initially do not react to the potential positive signals in managerial informative linguistic 
complexity at the call date, but realize the positive signal when analyst reports become available 
after the call. This delayed price reaction to informational cues, but not to obfuscation cues, 
suggests that obfuscation cues are easier for investors to detect at the conference call, whereas 
investors rely on analyst reports to clarify or confirm that the informational cues are indeed a 
positive signal about future earnings growth.   
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V. ADDITIONAL ANALYSES 
Linguistic Complexity and Guidance 
We corroborate the results on the relations between linguistic complexity and future 
earnings growth (Table 3) by examining the relation between linguistic complexity and the 
characteristics of managerial guidance. To provide a signal of future earnings growth, managers 
have incentives to “guide through the Fog”; i.e., providing more information when it is more 
difficult for investors to capture the signal through complex 10-Ks (Guay, Samuels, Taylor 2016). 
Managers can do so by providing more frequent guidance or by providing more precise guidance 
(Cheng, Luo, and Yue 2013; Ettredge, Huang and Zhang 2013; Baginski and Hassell 1997). 
Because managers have great discretion in determining forecast characteristics, prior studies find 
that management forecast precision reflects managerial incentives to disclose their private 
information through guidance (Cheng et al. 2013). Thus, managers provide more precise guidance 
when they disclose (conceal) their private information about the future (Cheng et al. 2013).  
We estimate the regression in equation (3) using managerial forecast precision as the 
dependent variable and report the results in Table 7. Following Ettredge et al. (2013) and Choi et 
al. 2010), management forecast precision is measured as the negative of the absolute value of the 
upper limit minus the lower limit, deflated by the share price at day ‒2 days, for range forecasts, 
or a dummy variable that equals 0 for annual earnings point forecasts. We find that Info(Both) is 
positively associated with management forecast precision, indicating that managers providing 
more information on the call also provide more precise guidance. We also find that Obfu(Present) 
is negative and significant, indicating that when managers are more likely to obfuscate in their 
responses to analyst questions, they tend to provide less precise guidance as well. This relation is 
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stronger for firms that just meet-or-beat earnings targets.8 These findings suggest that managers 
act consistently across their guidance and call disclosure decisions in signaling future earnings. 
 
Analyst Forecast Accuracy and Dispersion 
While the primary focus of our paper is whether the informational cues in managerial 
linguistic complexity on conference calls provide a directional prediction about analyst forecast 
revisions, we also examine whether such cues improve accuracy and reduce dispersion in analyst 
forecasts. A greater amount of informative linguistic complexity on the call allows analysts to 
more precisely assess the persistence of the earnings shock, which should lead to improvements in 
forecast accuracy and reductions in forecast dispersion relative to calls with less informative 
disclosure. For linguistic complexity that represents obfuscation, it is possible that all analysts 
view obfuscation as a similarly negative signal about future earnings news, and hence become 
more accurate in their forecasts. However, prior work suggests that obfuscation is successful in 
creating uncertainty about the true nature of the news (Bushee, et al. 2018). If managerial 
obfuscation on the call leads analysts to put less weight on the new public information in the call 
and rely more on private information or on stale information, then the accuracy of their forecasts 
should decrease and dispersion should increase. 
Table 7 reports the results from regressions of changes in analyst forecast accuracy and 
dispersion on the obfuscation and information components of Fog and the control variables 
(equation (3)). Panel A provides results for analyst forecast accuracy, define as the negative 
absolute value of analyst forecast errors (i.e., greater values indicate more accurate analyst 
forecasts). The change in analyst forecast accuracy around the call, ∆AF_ACCR, is measured as 
                                                            
8 We also examine the associations between a manager’s linguistic complexity on the conference call and their 
forecast horizons and we find a similar but statistically weaker inference.  
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[|Actual EPS – AFCpost|/beginning-of-quarter price] – [|Actual EPS – AFCpre|/beginning-of-
quarter price], multiplied by -1, where Actual EPS is the IBES actual and the analyst forecast 
variables are defined the same as in the forecast revision test (Kross and Suk 2012). 
In column (1), the coefficient on Info(Both) is positive and significant, indicating that a 
higher information component of linguistic complexity is associated with an improvement in 
forecast accuracy. Thus, analysts not only use informative linguistic complexity as a signal of 
future good news, but also use the actual disclosure to improve the accuracy of their forecasts. The 
coefficient on Obfu(Response) is negative and significant, suggesting that obfuscating linguistic 
complexity is associated with a decrease in the accuracy of the consensus forecast. Thus, while 
analysts correctly interpret obfuscation as bad news, the lack of informative disclosure, especially 
in the manager’s responses to questions, reduces the accuracy of the consensus forecast. 
In columns (2) and (3), we report the results with the interaction with potential earnings 
management indicators. None of the coefficients on the interactions between the potential earnings 
management indicators and Obfu(Present)/Obfu(Response) are significant, suggesting that 
obfuscation has a similar association on forecast accuracy regardless of earnings quality. However, 
the coefficients on the interactions between Info(Both) and both II_DA and MBE are positive and 
significant, indicating that the relation between the information component of linguistic 
complexity and forecast accuracy is strongly significant when the potential for earnings 
management is high.  
Panel B provides results with changes in analyst forecast dispersion as the dependent 
variable. The change in analyst forecast dispersion, ∆AF_DISP, is computed as (STD(AFCpost) – 
STD(AFCpre))/beginning-of-quarter price, where analyst forecast dispersion before (after) the call 
is the standard deviation of individual analysts’ annual EPS forecasts for year t+1, issued during 
28 
 
30 days before (after) the call. Similar to Kross and Suk (2012), we exclude observations if there 
are fewer than three analysts following a company for the 30-day period.  
The results for changes in dispersion are similar to (and in some cases stronger than) the 
results for forecast accuracy. In column (1), the coefficients on Obfu(Present) and Obfu(Response) 
are positive and significant, suggesting that analyst forecast dispersion increases following the 
conference calls when there is more obfuscation in managers’ presentations and Q&As. In columns 
(2) and (3), we find that the association is generally stronger when the probability of earnings 
management is higher. Thus, managerial obfuscation leads analysts to put less weight on the public 
information in the call and more weight on their private information and on their personal 
assessments about the probability of misreporting, increasing the dispersion in their forecasts.  
The coefficient on Info(Both) is negative and significant in column (1), indicating that 
analyst forecast dispersion declines following the calls with greater information components of 
linguistic complexity. In columns (2) and (3), the coefficients on Info(Both)×EM in both II_DA 
and MBE regressions are negative and significant, indicating that the relation between informative 
linguistic complexity and reductions in forecast dispersion are stronger when earnings 
management is more likely. Thus, informative complexity leads analysts to put more weight on 
the public information in the call, especially when there is uncertainty about earnings quality, 
reducing dispersion in forecasts. 
 
Changes in Institutional Ownership 
Finally, we examine whether institutional investors incorporate the informational cues in 
linguistic complexity into their trading decisions. Prior work finds that institutional investor 
ownership is positively associated with the readability of annual reports (Lundholm, Rogo, and 
Zhang 2014; Lang and Stice-Lawrence 2015). Guay, Samuels, and Taylor (2016) find the high 
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(low) institutional ownership is associated with managers “guiding through the Fog”; i.e., 
providing more (less) voluntary disclosure when the 10-K has high linguistic complexity. This 
work suggests that institutional investors prefer less complex disclosure, in general. But, to the 
best of our knowledge, prior work has not looked at changes in institutional holdings in response 
to linguistic complexity, nor the Bushee, et al. (2018) decomposition of linguistic complexity into 
obfuscation and information components. We expect that, as sophisticated investors, institutional 
investors would efficiently react to the informational cues in linguistic complexity and tend to buy 
(sell) firms with higher information (obfuscation) Fog. 
Table 8, Panel A, presents the results from regressions of changes in institutional ownership 
on the obfuscation and information components of Fog and the control variables (equation (3)). 
We measure the change in institutional investor ownership, ΔINST_OWN, as the difference 
between the percentage of institutional ownership at the beginning and end of the calendar quarter 
containing the conference call. Because institutional investor trading is not available within the 
quarter, it is challenging to identify whether the quarterly change in institutional holdings is 
reacting to the information in the conference call, per se, or to the analyst forecast revisions or 
stock return reactions to the call. Thus, we also include as controls the analyst forecast revision 
(AF_REV) and the stock returns during and after the call (CAR and POST_CAR, respectively). 
Column (1) shows that the change in institutional ownership is significantly positively 
associated with the analyst forecast revisions; stock returns during and after the call; the earnings 
surprise; and both forward-looking statements and positive tone words in the response. Controlling 
for these effects, there is some evidence that ΔINST_OWN has a significantly negative incremental 
association with obfuscation Fog in the presentation (Obfu(Present)), and that this relation is 
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stronger for firms that just meet-or-beat expectations.9 The coefficient on Info(Both) is positive 
and significant, indicating that institutional investors trade in response to the positive signal in 
informative linguistic complexity; however, institutions do not react more strongly when there is 
a higher potential for earnings management. These results suggest that institutional investors also 
react to the informational cues in linguistic complexity. However, given the lack of evidence for 
an immediate stock return reaction to informative Fog in Table 5, the results suggest that 
institutional investors likely do not react to informative Fog immediately, but rather only increase 
their holdings once they gather additional information (or once they realize that the positive signal 
has not yet been priced by the market). These findings are consistent with Bushee, Jung, and Miller 
(2011) who find that the institutional ownership increases with the number of the conference 
presentations the company makes, suggesting that the institutional investors gradually increase 
their ownership as they gather more information.  
Since institutions have different investment horizons and information gathering 
capabilities, we further examine three different groups of institutional investors: transient, 
dedicated, and quasi-indexers, following the classification of Bushee (2001) and Bushee and Noe 
(2000). We expect that transient investors, who have a short-term focus, will be more likely to 
trade in response to informational cues in conference calls. As longer-term investors, dedicated 
and quasi-indexer investors should exhibit less sensitivity to linguistic complexity in earnings calls. 
Column (1) of Panel B shows that changes in ownership by transient institutions are 
significantly negatively (positively) associated with obfuscation (information) Fog in managerial 
linguistic complexity in the conference call. Thus, transient institutions trade in response to the 
                                                            
9 If we exclude AF_REV from the regression, the coefficient on Obfu(Response) is negative and significant, 
indicating that any association between institutional ownership and managerial obfuscation in the response is 
subsumed by including the analyst forecast revision.  
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negative (positive) signals about future earnings growth in managerial linguistic complexity, 
consistent with their short-term-focused trading strategies (Bushee and Noe 2000).  
Columns (2) and (3) show results for changes in ownership by dedicated and quasi-indexer 
institutions, respectively. We find that the changes in these two types of institutional ownership 
are unrelated to obfuscation or information Fog in the conference call. These findings indicate that 
dedicated and quasi-indexer institutions are likely indifferent to managerial information cues 
during the call because they are not frequent traders and the liquidity benefits of informative 
disclosure are less important to them than to transient institutions.10  
 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Prior research suggests that managers use high linguistic complexity (i.e., Fog) in SEC 
filings to obfuscate poor performance. We find similar behavior in conference calls, as the 
obfuscation component of managerial Fog predicts lower future earnings growth. However, we 
also find new evidence that linguistic complexity used to provide more informative technical 
disclosure provides a positive signal of future earnings growth. We also find that these 
informational cues in linguistic complexity are stronger for firms with a higher potential for 
earnings management (e.g., income-increasing discretionary accruals and just meet-or-beat 
earnings targets), consistent with managers having stronger incentives to obfuscate poor 
performance and to inform about good performance when earnings quality is uncertain. 
We find that analysts correctly interpret the negative (positive) signal about future 
performance in obfuscation (information) Fog and revise their forecasts downward (upward) 
accordingly. However, investors only correctly interpret the negative signal of obfuscation during 
                                                            
10 Similar to the results for total institutional ownership, we find little evidence that the relations are stronger for 
firms with a higher probability of earnings management (untabulated). 
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the call; stock returns during the call window are negatively associated with obfuscatory Fog, but 
unrelated to informative Fog. Consequently, we find a delayed price reaction, in which stock 
returns subsequent to the call are positively related to informative managerial Fog during the call, 
likely due to investors receiving analyst reports that correctly interpret the positive signal in 
informative Fog. Thus, analysts fulfill an important informational role by efficiently incorporating 
linguistic complexity during conference calls into their forecasts. 
The advantage of the conference call setting is that we can control for the economic nature 
of the news (e.g., the earnings surprise) and other linguistic attributes to better isolate the role of 
linguistic complexity. There is also a low probability of reverse causality in our setting because it 
is unlikely that analysts intending to revise their forecasts downward would (or could) intentionally 
try to elicit obfuscatory linguistic complexity from managers. However, a caveat to our results is 
that it is difficult to conclusively establish causality between managers’ linguistic choices and 
analysts’ and investors’ information processing in a conference call setting. Despite this, our 
results provide new evidence on the analyst and investor responses to linguistic complexity 
through exploiting the Bushee, et al. (2018) decomposition of linguistic complexity into its 
informative and obfuscatory components. These results suggest future research can increase the 
power of their tests examining textual attributes by using a similar decomposition.  
33 
 
References 
Abarbanell, J., and R. Lehavy. 2003. Can stock recommendations predict earnings management 
and analysts’ earnings forecast errors? Journal of Accounting Research 41 (1): 1‒31. 
Ajinkya, B., S. Bhojraj, and P. Sengupta. 2005. The association between outside directors, 
institutional investors and the properties of management earnings forecasts Journal of 
Accounting Research 43 (3): 343‒376. 
Baginski, S. P., and J. M. Hassell. 1997. Determinants of management forecast precision. The 
Accounting Review 72 (2): 303–312. 
Ball, R. A. Y., and L. Shivakumar. 2006. The role of accruals in asymmetrically timely gain and 
loss recognition. Journal of Accounting Research 44 (2): 207‒242. 
Billings, M. B., R. Jennings, and B. Lev. 2015. On guidance and volatility. Journal of Accounting 
and Economics 60 (2–3): 161‒180. 
Bowen, R. M., A. K. Davis, and D. A. Matsumoto. 2002. Do conference calls affect analysts' 
forecasts? The Accounting Review 77 (2): 285‒316. 
Bozanic, Z., and M. Thevenot. 2015. Qualitative disclosure and changes in sell-side financial 
analysts' information environment. Contemporary Accounting Research 32 (4): 1595‒1616. 
Bradshaw, M. T., S. A. Richardson, and R. G. Sloan. 2001. Do analysts and auditors use 
information in accruals? . Journal of Accounting Research 39 (1): 45‒74. 
Brown, L. D., A. C. Call, M. B. Clement, and N. Y. Sharp. 2015. Inside the "Black box" of sell-
side financial analysts. Journal of Accounting Research 53 (1): 1‒47. 
Burgstahler, D., and I. Dichev. 1997. Earnings management to avoid earnings decreases and losses. 
Journal of Accounting and Economics 24 (1): 99‒126. 
Burgstahler, D., and M. J. Eames. 2003. Earnings management to avoid losses and earnings 
decreases: Are analysts fooled? Contemporary Accounting Research 20 (2): 253‒294.  
Bushee, B. J. 2001. Do institutional investors prefer near-term earnings over long-run value? 
Contemporary Accounting Research 18 (2): 207‒246.  
Bushee, B. J., I. D. Gow, and D. J. Taylor. 2018. Linguistic complexity in firm disclosures 
obfuscation or information? Journal of Accounting Research 56 (1): 85‒121. 
Bushee, B. J., D. Matsumoto, and G. Miller. 2004. Managerial and investor responses to disclosure 
regulation: The case of Reg FD and conference calls. The Accounting Review 79: 617–643. 
Bushee, B. J., and C. F. Noe. 2000. Corporate disclosure practices, institutional investors, and 
stock return volatility. Journal of Accounting Research 38 (Supplement): 171‒202.  
Cheng, Q., T. Luo, and Y. Yue. 2013. Managerial incentives and management forecast precision. 
The Accounting Review 88 (5): 1575–1602. 
Choi, J., L. A. Myers, Y. Zang, and D. A. Ziebart. 2010. The roles that forecast surprises and 
forecast error play in determining management forecast precision. Accounting Horizons 24 
(24): 165–188. 
Coles, J. L., M. Hertzel, and S. Kalpathy. 2006. Earnings management around employee stock 
option reissues. Journal of Accounting and Economics 41 (1-2): 173‒200. 
Dechow, P. M., S. A. Richardson, and I. Tuna. 2003. Why are earnings kinky? An examination of 
the earnings management explanation. Review of Accounting Studies 8 (2-3): 355‒384. 
Ettredge, M., Y. Huang, and W. Zhang. 2013. Restatement disclosures and management earnings 
forecasts. Accounting Horizons 27 (2): 347–369. 
Filzen, J. J., and K. Peterson. 2015. Financial statement complexity and meeting analysts' 
expectations. Contemporary Accounting Research 32 (4): 1560‒1594.  
34 
 
Guay, W., D. Samuels, and D. Taylor. 2016. Guiding through the Fog: Financial statement 
complexity and voluntary disclosure, Journal of Accounting and Economics 62: 234‒269.  
Gunning, R. 1952. The technique of clear writing. New York, NY: McGraw-Hill International 
Book Co. 
Hollander, S., M. Pronk, and E. Roelofsen. 2010. Does silence speak? An empirical analysis of 
disclosure choices during conference calls, Journal of Accounting Research 48: 531‒563. 
Huang, A. H., A. Y. Zang, and Z. Rong. 2014. Evidence on the information content of text in 
analyst reports. The Accounting Review 89 (6): 2151‒2180. 
Jeter, D., and L. Shivakumar. 1999. Cross-sectional estimation of abnormal accruals using 
quarterly and annual data: Effectiveness in detecting event-specific earnings management. 
Accounting and Business Research 29 (4): 299‒319. 
Kimbrough, M. D. 2005. The effect of conference calls on analyst and market underreaction to 
earnings announcements. Accounting Review 80 (1): 189‒219. 
Kothari, S. P., A. J. Leone, and C. E. Wasley. 2005. Performance matched discretionary accrual 
measures. Journal of Accounting and Economics 39 (1): 163‒197. 
Kross, W. J., B. T. Ro, and I. Suk. 2011. Consistency in meeting or beating earnings expectations 
and management earnings forecasts. Journal of Accounting and Economics 51 (1–2): 37‒
57. 
Kross, W. J., and I. Suk. 2012. Does regulation fd work? Evidence from analysts' reliance on public 
disclosure. Journal of Accounting and Economics 53 (1–2): 225‒248. 
Lang, M. H., and R. J. Lundholm. 1996. Corporate disclosure policy and analyst behavior. 
Accounting Review 71 (4): 467‒492. 
Lang, M. H., L. Stice-Lawrence. 2015. Textual analysis and international financial reporting: 
Large sample evidence. Journal of Accounting and Economics 60: 110‒135. 
Lee, J. 2016. Can investors detect managers' lack of spontaneity? Adherence to predetermined 
scripts during earnings conference calls. Accounting Review 91 (1): 229‒250. 
Lehavy, R., L. Feng, and K. Merkley. 2011. The effect of annual report readability on analyst 
following and the properties of their earnings forecasts. Accounting Review 86 (3): 1087‒
1115. 
Lev, B., and D. Nissim. 2004. Taxable income, future earnings, and equity values. The Accounting 
Review 79 (4): 1039‒1074. 
Li, F. 2008. Annual report readability, current earnings, and earnings persistence. Journal of 
Accounting and Economics 45 (2-3): 221‒247.  
Lo, K., F. Ramos, and R. Rogo. 2017. Earnings management and annual report readability. Journal 
of Accounting and Economics 63 (1): 1‒25. 
Loughran, T., and B. McDonald. 2011. When is a liability not a liability? Textual analysis, 
dictionaries, and 10‐Ks, The Journal of Finance 66 (1): 35‒65. 
Loughran, T., and B. McDonald. 2016. Textual analysis in accounting and finance: A survey. 
Journal of Accounting Research 54 (4): 1187‒1230. 
Lundholm, R., R. Rogo, and J. Zhang. 2014. Restoring the Tower of Babel: How foreign firms 
communicate with U.S. investors. The Accounting Review 89: 1453‒1485. 
Matsumoto, D., M. Pronk, and E. Roelofsen. 2011. What makes conference calls useful? The 
information content of managers' presentations and analysts' discussion sessions. The 
Accounting Review 86 (4): 1383‒1414. 
Mayew, W. J. 2008. Evidence of management discrimination among analysts during earnings 
conference calls. Journal of Accounting Research 46 (3): 627‒659. 
35 
 
Mayew, W. J., and M. Venkatachalam. 2012. The power of voice: Managerial affective states and 
future firm performance. The Journal of Finance 67 (1): 1‒44. 
Mayew, W. J., N. Y. Sharp, and M. Venkatachalam. 2013. Using earnings conference calls to 
identify analysts with superior private information. Review of Accounting Studies 18 (2): 
386‒413. 
Miller, B. P. 2010. The effects of reporting complexity on small and large investor trading. The 
Accounting Review 85: 2107–2143. 
Price, S. M., J. Doran, D. Peterson, and B. Bliss. 2012. Earnings conference calls and stock returns: 
The incremental informativeness of textual tone. Journal of Banking & Finance 36: 992–
1011. 
Rennekamp, K., M. Sethuraman, and B. Steenhoven. 2019. Engagement in Earnings Conference 
Calls: A Multi-Method Examination. Working Paper, Cornell University.  
Suslava, K. 2017. Stiff business headwinds and unchartered economic waters: The use of 
euphemisms in earnings conference calls. Working paper, Rutgers Newark and New 
Brunswick.  
Twedt, B., and L. Rees. 2012. Reading between the lines: An empirical examination of qualitative 
attributes of financial analysts’ reports. Journal of Accounting and Public Policy 31: 1‒21. 
  
36 
 
 
APPENDIX  
Variable Definitions 
Variable   Definition 
Measures of linguistic complexity 
Fog(.) = Fog index of the respective portion of the conference call. Fog(Analyst) refers to the
Fog index of analysts during the call. Fog(Present) refers to the Fog index of
managers during the presentation portion of the call. Fog(Response) refers to the Fog
index of managers’ during the response portion of the call. 
Obfu(.) = Estimated latent obfuscation component following Bushee, Gow, and Taylor (2018).
Obfu(Present) refers to the presentation portion of the call, and Obfu(Response)
refers to the response portion of the call.  
Info(.) = Estimated latent information component following Bushee, Gow, and Taylor (2018).
Info(Present) refers to the presentation portion of the call, and Info(Response) refers
to the response portion of the call. Info(call) refers to the first principal component of
Info(Present) and Info(Response). 
 
Firm characteristics to estimate linguistic complexity 
Acquisitions = Total acquisitions during the quarter, scaled by total assets at the beginning of the
quarter. 
BM = Book value of equity scaled by market value of equity at the beginning of the quarter.
Capex = Amount of capital expenditures scaled by total assets at the beginning of the quarter.
CapIntensity = Net plant, property, and equipment scaled, scaled by total assets at the beginning of 
the quarter. 
Financing = Amount raised from stock and debt issuances during the quarter scaled by total assets
at the beginning of the quarter. 
Goodwill = Indicator variable for whether the firm had a goodwill impairment charge that quarter
Leverage = Long-term debt plus short-term debt, scaled by total assets at the beginning of the
quarter. 
R&D = Ratio of research and development expense to sales. 
Restructuring = Indicator variable for whether the firm had a restructuring charge that quarter 
Returns = Buy-and-hold return over the quarter, in percent. 
Size = Natural log of market value of equity at the beginning of the quarter. 
σCFO = Standard deviation of cash flows from operations scaled by total assets at over the
prior five years.  
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Dependent Variables  
GROWTHt+1 = Future earnings growth, measured as operating income from year t+1 minus 
operating income in year t, scaled by total assets in year t and then multiply 
by 100, following Huang et al. (2014).  
AF_REV = Analyst forecast revision, computed as (AFCpost - AFCpre)/beginning-of 
quarter price. It is measured as the difference between the median of analyst 
forecasts for year t+1 earnings, issued within 30 days post to the conference 
call (AFCpost), and the median of analyst forecasts for year t+1 earnings, 
issued within 30 days prior to the conference call (AFCpre), and then the 
difference is scaled by price at the beginning of the fiscal quarter. If analysts 
made more than one median consensus analyst forecast during the specified 
period above, we use the one closest to the conference call date in 
calculating AFCpost and AFCpre.
CAR = The three-day (-1, 1) cumulative abnormal return around the conference call 
disclosure date. Abnormal returns are measured as the raw return from 
CRSP minus the return on the portfolio of firms with approximately the 
same size (the market value of equity as of December) and book-to-market 
(BM) ratio (as of the prior June). 
CAR_AnalystReport = The three-day (-1, 1) cumulative market-adjusted abnormal return around 
the first analyst report issued subsequent to the conference call window. 
Day 0 is the day when the first analyst forecast following the conference 
call is issued. 
MGMT_PRECISION = An indicator variable that equals the negative of (the absolute value of [the 
upper limit minus the lower limit] deflated by the share price at day-2 day 
for range forecasts, or zero for annual earnings point forecasts. A larger 
coefficient is associated with more precise forecasts. 
POST_CAR = The cumulative daily abnormal return over the period beginning on Day +2 
after quarter t’s earnings announcement and ending on the Day +1 after the 
earnings announcement date for quarter t+1.  
ΔAF_ACCR = Change in analyst forecast accuracy, defined as the difference in negative 
absolute value of analyst forecast errors. It is measured by {(ABS(Actual 
EPS -AFCpost)/beginning-of quarter price) - (ABS(Actual -
AFCpre)/beginning-of quarter price)}*(-1), where AFCpost (AFCpre is the 
median consensus analyst forecast issued within 30 days after (before) the 
managers' conference calls and Actual EPS is the IBES actual. We multiply 
the result by -1 such that greater values indicate more accurate forecasts.  
ΔAF_DISP = Change in analyst forecast dispersion, defined as the difference in standard 
deviation of analyst annual earnings forecasts. It is measured by 
(STD(AFCpost) - STD(AFCpre))/beginning-of quarter price, where 
AFCpost (AFCpre) is the standard deviation of individual analyst forecasts 
issued within 30 days after (before) the managers' conference calls.  
ΔINST_OWN = The change in percentage of institutional ownership from the end of 
calendar quarter prior to the conference call to the end of quarter t+1. 
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Independent and Additional Variables of Interest 
II_DA = An indicator variable that equals one if the annual discretionary accruals are 
income increasing. Discretionary accruals are estimated using the cross-
sectional (Ball and Shivakumar 2006) model and controlling for firm 
performance following (Kothari et al. 2005), estimated by industry and 
year. Specifically, discretionary accruals are estimated as the residual from 
the regression: AC = α + β1ΔR + β2PPE + β3CFO + β4DCFO + β5CFO × 
DCFO + β6ROA + ε. AC is (cash flow from operations – income before 
extraordinary items)/average total assets; ΔR is (revenuet – revenuet-
1)/average total assets; PPE is gross property, plant, and equipment/average 
total assets; CFO is cash flow from operations/average total assets; DCFO 
is an indicator variable equal to one if CFO is negative, and zero otherwise; 
and ROA is (net income before extraordinary items)/average total assets.  
MBE = An indicator variable that equals one if ΔEPS (EPSq - EPSq-4) falls in the 
neighborhood from zero to three cents; 0 otherwise. 
UESURP = The difference between Actual earnings and the most recent median 
consensus analyst forecast prior to the conference call date, scaled by the 
price at the beginning of the fiscal quarter.  
AFSTD = The standard deviation of analyst forecasts in the fiscal quarter prior to the 
conference call disclosure, scaled by price at the beginning of the fiscal 
quarter. 
ΔLEPS = The change in earnings per share at the beginning of the quarter (EPSq-1 – 
EPSq–5) prior to the conference call disclosure, scaled by q-5 quarter price.
RET = Market-adjusted (value-weighted) buy-and-hold returns for the previous 12 
months prior to the conference call disclosure.  
RET VOL = Stock return volatility, measured as the standard deviation of daily stock 
returns over the period [-127, -2] relative to the conference call date, 
following Mayew and Venkatachalam (2012). 
RET MOM = The buy-and-hold return over the window [-127, -2] before the conference 
call date, following Mayew and Venkatachalam (2012). 
SIZE = Natural log of market value of equity at the beginning of the fiscal quarter, 
prior to the conference call disclosure.  
LMB = Natural log of market-to-book ratio at beginning of the fiscal quarter, prior 
to the conference call disclosure.  
AFN = The number of analysts following at the end of the fiscal quarter, prior to 
the conference call disclosure.  
INST_OWN = The percentage of institutional ownership at the beginning of the fiscal year 
end, prior to the conference call disclosure.  
ROA = An indicator variable that equals one if ROA in year t is negative; 0 
otherwise. 
LOSS = An indicator variable that equals one if ROA in year t is negative.  
DSUE = The decile of earnings surprise, which is defined as the actual EPS minus 
the most recent consensus analyst forecast, scaled by the price at the 
beginning of the fiscal quarter. The coefficient of DSUE can be interpreted 
as the abnormal return earned on a zero-investment portfolio that takes a 
long position in the highest DSUE decile (DSUE=1) and a short position in 
the lowest DSUE decile (DSUE=0). 
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SPECIAL = An indicator variable that equals one if firm i reports negative special items 
in quarter t; 0 otherwise.  
4thQTR = An indicator variable that equals one if the earnings announcement is for 
the fourth fiscal quarter; 0 otherwise.  
RESPONSIVE = An indicator variable that equals one if there is at least one analyst revising 
the forecast of next year's earnings within two trading days after the current 
quarter earnings announcement; 0 otherwise.  
BNEWS = An indicator variable that equals one if the unexpected earnings are 
negative; 0 otherwise.  
EP Ratio = Basic earnings per share (excluding extraordinary items) scaled by price at 
the beginning of the fiscal quarter.  
FWDLOOK(Present) = The proportion of sentences containing forward-looking statements in the 
presentation of the call. We classify sentences in the call as forward-looking 
sentences if they include at least one forward-looking term, following Li 
(2010) and Bozanic et al. (2018).  
FWDLOOK(Response) = The proportion of sentences containing forward-looking statements in the 
response of the call.  
POSTONE(Present) = The number of positive tone words in the presentation of the call.  
POSTONE(Response) = The number of positive tone words in the response of the call.  
NEGTONE(Present) = The number of negative tone words in the presentation of the call.  
NEGTONE(Response) = The number of negative tone words in the response of the call.  
GUIDANCE = An indicator variable that equals one if at least one quantitative guidance is 
provided on the same day as the conference call, based on the IBES 
Guidance database.  
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Table 1 
Estimating the Latent Components of Managers’ Linguistic Complexity 
 
Panel A: Estimating Latent Components of Linguistic Complexity 
Dependent Variable  Fog (Present) Fog (Response) 
Variable (1)   (2)   
Fog(Analyst) 0.085 *** 0.341 *** 
  (21.89)   (62.35)   
Size -0.974 *** -0.010   
  (-13.24)   (-0.45)   
Leverage 0.349 *** 0.148 *** 
  (4.93)   (4.77)   
BM -0.092   -0.287 *** 
  (-1.21)   (-6.65)   
Returns -0.163 *** -0.037 *** 
  (-7.59)   (-3.82)   
Acquisitions -0.305 *** -0.059 * 
  (-5.69)   (-2.09)   
CapIntensity -0.490 *** -0.619 *** 
  (-5.67)   (-18.32)   
Capex 0.001   0.132 ** 
  (0.02)   (2.36)   
R&D 0.369 *** 0.420 *** 
  (4.46)   (8.44)   
Financing 0.133 * 0.030   
  (1.72)   (1.15)   
σCFO -0.295 *** -0.354 *** 
  (-6.48)   (-7.6)   
Goodwill 0.232 *** 0.076 ** 
  (2.97)   (2.55)   
Restructing -0.066   0.062 *** 
  (-0.99)   (4.56)   
No.Obs. 71,648 71,648 
Adj R2 7.324% 20.51%
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Table 1 
Estimating the Latent Components of Managers’ Linguistic Complexity 
 
Panel B: Descriptive Statistics of Estimated Latent Components of Linguistic Complex
  Variable Mean Std P25 Median P75   
 Obfu(Present) 0.000 1.455 -0.925 0.009 0.959 
 Obfu(Response) 0.000 1.499 -1.047 -0.146 0.907 
 Info(Present) 16.116 0.409 15.821 16.095 16.397 
 Info(Response) 12.708 0.761 12.190 12.628 13.125 
  Info(Both) 0.000 0.800 -0.546 -0.083 0.440 
Table 1 presents the regression results and descriptive statistics of the latent components of the linguistic complexity. 
Panel A reports results from estimating the linguistic complexity of managers during the respective portion of the 
conference call, Fog(Present) and Fog(Response), as a function of the linguistic complexity of analysts, Fog(Analyst), 
and variables related to business complexity. We use the following variables to measure business complexity: firm 
size (Size); firm leverage (Leverage); book-to-market ratio (BM); historical stock performance (Returns); acquisitions 
(Acquisitions), capital intensity (CapIntensity), capital expenditures (Capex), research and development (R&D); debt 
and equity issuance (Financing); cash flow volatility (σCFO); goodwill impairments (Goodwill) and restructuring 
charges (Restructuring). See Appendix for variable definitions. For ease of interpretation, each of the variables is 
ranked into deciles and scaled to range from 0 to 1. t-statistics appear in parentheses and are based on standard errors 
clustered by firm and disclosure date of the conference call. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 0.01, 
0.05, and 0.10 levels (two-tail), respectively. Panel B reports the distribution of our empirical estimates of the latent 
components of managers’ linguistic complexity. Obfu(.) is the latent obfuscation component during the respective 
section of the call and Info(.) is the latent information component during the respective section of the call. Info(Both) 
is the first principal component of Info(Present) and Info(Response). 
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Table 2 
Descriptive Statistics 
 
Variables N Mean Std P25 Median P75 
Obfu(Present) 29,664 -0.0638 1.4335 -0.9781 -0.0590 0.8822 
Obfu(Response) 29,664 -0.0709 1.4373 -1.0897 -0.2368 0.7876 
Info(Both) 29,664 0.0118 0.7390 -0.4879 -0.0698 0.4198 
GROWTHt+1 28,391 0.5002 5.8154 -1.1518 0.5227 2.2628 
AF_REV 29,664 0.0003 0.0147 -0.0014 0.0002 0.0031 
ΔINST_OWN 27,644 0.0008 0.0997 -0.0398 0.0055 0.0540 
CAR 29,664 0.0016 0.0734 -0.0342 0.0011 0.0390 
POST_CAR 29,225 0.0031 0.1487 -0.0780 0.0053 0.0861 
ΔAF_ACCR 29,656 0.0000 0.0118 -0.0014 0.0002 0.0022 
ΔAF_DISP 21,224 0.0022 0.1280 -0.0358 -0.0024 0.0333 
II_DA 29,664 0.3863 0.4869 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 
MBE 29,664 0.1067 0.3088 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
UESURP 29,664 -0.0026 0.0296 -0.0037 0.0003 0.0035 
AFSTD 29,664 0.0076 0.0165 0.0012 0.0030 0.0071 
ΔLEPS 29,664 0.0013 0.0159 -0.0021 0.0012 0.0041 
RET 29,664 0.0496 0.3646 -0.1581 0.0062 0.1903 
SIZE 29,664 8.1858 1.6298 7.0426 8.1700 9.2831 
BM 29,664 0.4680 0.2582 0.2500 0.4500 0.6800 
AFN 29,664 21.019 16.271 9.0000 17.000 28.000 
INST_OWN 29,664 0.7628 0.2080 0.6623 0.7992 0.9003 
RET_VOL 29,565 0.0198 0.0112 0.0117 0.0169 0.0248 
RET_MOM 29,565 0.0083 0.1959 -0.1024 -0.0002 0.1057 
ROA 28,391 0.0815 0.1070 0.0457 0.0840 0.1320 
LOSS 29,664 0.1742 0.3792 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
R&D 29,664 0.0706 0.2104 0.0000 0.0000 0.0660 
FWDLOOK(Present) 29,664 4.4982 2.8706 2.0000 4.0000 7.0000 
FWDLOOK(Response) 29,664 4.3127 2.7561 2.0000 2.0000 7.0000 
POSTONE(Present) 29,664 4.4991 2.8730 2.0000 5.0000 7.0000 
POSTONE(Response) 29,664 4.2655 2.7685 2.0000 2.0000 7.0000 
NEGTONE(Present) 29,664 4.4992 2.8722 2.0000 4.0000 7.0000 
NEGTONE(Response) 29,664 4.3651 2.7388 2.0000 2.0000 7.0000 
GUIDANCE 29,664 0.4002 0.4900 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 
Notes: Table 2 presents descriptive statistics for the full sample. Our sample is constructed from the intersection of 
SeekingAlpha.com, I/B/E/S, and CRSP/Compustat. Panel A reports the descriptive statistics for various variables 
used in our analysis. Panel B reports the correlation coefficients among these variables. Spearman (Pearson) 
correlations appear above (below) the diagonal and bold denotes correlations statistically significant at the 1% level. 
All variables are defined in Appendix and winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles.  
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Table 3 
Linguistic Complexity and Future Earnings Growth 
 
Dependent Variable   Dependent Variable = GROWTHt+1 
Interaction terms  II_DA MBE  Variable Exp.Sign (1) (2) (3)   
Obfu(Present) − -0.0828 *** -0.0754 ** -0.0779 *** 
  (-2.84) (-2.07) (-2.59)  
Obfu(Response) − -0.0651 ** -0.0152 -0.0516 * 
  (-2.27) (-0.45) (-1.65)  
Info(Both) + 0.1141 ** -0.0912 0.1131 ** 
  (2.22) (-1.49) (2.10)  
Obfu(Present) * EM − -0.1094 ** -0.1576 ** 
  (-2.14) (-2.37)  
Obfu(Response) * EM − -0.1429 ** -0.1292 ** 
  (-2.36) (-2.09)  
Info(Both) * EM + 0.5100 *** 0.2229 * 
  (4.60) (1.76)  
II_DA  -0.2313 **  
  (-2.57)  
MBE  -0.1884  
  (-1.55)  
RET  0.3983 ** 0.3871 ** 0.4272 ***   (2.52) (2.36) (2.59)  
SIZE  0.0748 ** 0.0536 0.0611 *   (2.11) (1.58) (1.75)  
BM  -0.8540 *** -0.7292 *** -1.0043 ***   (-4.13) (-3.52) (-5.13)  
AFN  0.0004 0.0011 0.0004    (0.09) (0.28) (0.09)  
INST_OWN  0.8859 *** 0.8682 *** 0.8618 *** 
  (3.58) (3.72) (3.68)  
ROA  -12.536 *** -11.585 *** -12.448 ***   (-13.44) (-12.45) (-13.52)  
UESURP  4.9067 ** 4.3945 ** 5.0805 **   (2.41) (2.15) (2.50)  
FWDLOOK(Present)  -0.0290 -0.0269 -0.0211  
 (-1.50) (-1.37) (-1.05)  
FWDLOOK(Response) -0.0082 -0.0015 0.0010   
 (-0.24) (-0.04) (0.03)  
POSTONE(Present)  0.0040 0.0168 0.0089  
 (0.25) (1.02) (0.54)  
POSTONE(Response) 0.0262 0.0253 0.0285  
 (0.99) (0.98) (1.07)  
NEGTONE(Present)  0.0219 0.0116 0.0104  
 (1.11) (0.56) (0.48)  
NEGTONE(Response) -0.0743 ** -0.0863 *** -0.0884 *** 
 (-2.54) (-2.99) (-3.04)  
GUIDANCE  0.3696 *** 0.4015 *** 0.3827 *** 
  (4.34) (4.61) (4.30)  
Firm FE  YES YES YES      No.Obs.   28391 28391 28391   
Adj R2   4.90% 4.50% 4.47%   
Notes: Table 3 presents results from estimating the relation between the future earnings growth and the latent components of 
linguistic complexity. All the variables are as defined in Appendix. t-statistics appear in parentheses and are based on standard 
errors clustered by firm and disclosure date of the conference call. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05, 
and 0.10 levels (two-tail), respectively. 
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Table 4 
Linguistic Complexity and Analyst Forecast Revisions  
  
     Dependent Variable = AF_REV Interaction terms     II_DA MBE  Variable Exp.Sign (1) (2) (3)   
Obfu(Present) − -0.0001 ** -0.0001 -0.0001 ** 
 
 (-2.18)  (-1.28) (-1.96)  
Obfu(Response) − -0.0001 ** 0.0000 -0.0001 * 
  (-2.18)  (-0.35)  (-1.68)  
Info(Both) + 0.0004 *** 0.0002 * 0.0003 *** 
  (3.38)  (1.83)  (2.66)  
Obfu(Present) * EM −   0.0000 0.0000  
 
 (-0.29) (-0.54)  
Obfu(Response) * EM −   -0.0003 ** -0.0002 ** 
 
   (-2.30) (-2.42)  
Info(Both) * EM +   0.0004 ** 0.0005 *** 
 
 (2.00) (2.63)  
II_DA    0.0001  
  (0.58)  
MBE    0.0001  
   (0.38)  
UESURP  0.1726 *** 0.1721 *** 0.1727 ***   (18.19)  (17.80) (18.19)  
AFSTD  -0.0313 * -0.0321 ** -0.0312 *   (-1.93)  (-2.00) (-1.92)  
CAR  0.0318 *** 0.0318 *** 0.0318 ***   (17.77)  (17.64) (17.73)  ΔLEPS  0.1164 *** 0.1169 *** 0.1164 ***   (8.54)  (8.49) (8.54)  
RET  0.0024 *** 0.0024 *** 0.0024 ***   (7.35)  (7.43) (7.36)  
SIZE  0.0002 * 0.0002 * 0.0002 *   (1.85)  (1.85) (1.87)  
BM  0.0008 * 0.0009 * 0.0008 *   (1.68)  (1.91) (1.72)  
AFN  0.0000  0.0000 0.0000    (-1.02)  (-0.89) (-1.02)  
INST_OWN  -0.0009 * -0.0009 * -0.0009 * 
  (-1.67)  (-1.85) (-1.68)  
FWDLOOK(Present) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000    (-0.51)  (-1.06) (-0.51)  
FWDLOOK(Response) 0.0000  0.0000 0.0000  (0.29)  (0.11) (0.28)  
POSTONE(Present) 0.0000  0.0000 0.0000  (0.67)  (0.53) (0.68)  
POSTONE(Response) 0.0000  0.0000 0.0000  (-0.11)  (0.04) (-0.09)  
NEGTONE(Present) 0.0000  0.0000 0.0000  (0.22)  (0.30) (0.22)  
NEGTONE(Response) 0.0001  0.0001 0.0001  (0.91)  (0.98) (0.88)  
GUIDANCE 0.0000  0.0000 0.0000  
  (0.23)  (-0.15) (0.25)  
Firm FE  YES  YES YES  No. Obs.   29,664  29,664     29,664    
Adj R2   22.17% 22.07%   22.18%   
Notes: Table 4 presents results from estimating the relation between analyst forecast revisions and the latent components of 
linguistic complexity. All the variables are as defined in Appendix. t-statistics appear in parentheses and are based on standard 
errors clustered by firm and disclosure date of the conference call. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05, 
and 0.10 levels (two-tail), respectively. 
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Table 5 
Linguistic Complexity and Abnormal Returns at the Conference Call  
    Dependent Variable = CAR 
Interaction terms  
 
II_DA MBE  Variable Exp.Sign (1) (2) (3)   
Obfu(Present) − -0.0011 *** -0.0015 *** -0.0011 *** 
  (-3.02) (-3.20) (-2.98) 
 
Obfu(Response) − -0.0011 *** -0.0007 -0.0009 ** 
  (-2.66) (-1.56) (-2.18) 
Info(Both) + -0.0005 -0.0005 -0.0007 
 
 (-0.66) (-0.68) (-1.09)  
Obfu(Present) * EM − 0.0008 0.0000  
  (1.20) (-0.04) 
 
Obfu(Response) * EM − -0.0011 -0.0018 * 
    (-1.52) (-1.70) 
 
Info(Both) * EM +   0.0000 0.0029    (0.00) (1.20)  
II_DA 
 -0.0028 **  
 
 (-2.17)  
MBE 
 -0.002    (-1.17)  
DSUE  0.0444 *** 0.044 *** 0.044 *** 
  (13.11) (13.19) (13.19)  ΔLEPS  0.287 *** 0.289 *** 0.286 ***   (7.86) (7.91) (7.85)  
SIZE  0.0001 0.0001 0.0001    (0.23) (0.24) (0.19)  
BM  0.002 0.0022 0.0018    (0.92) (1.09) (0.88)  
RET_VOL  0.271 *** 0.264 *** 0.267 ***   (3.38) (3.31) (3.36)  
RET_MOM  -0.0214 *** -0.0213 *** -0.0213 ***   (-6.05) (-6.07) (-6.03)  
AFN  -0.0001 * -0.0001 * -0.0001 *   (-1.71) (-1.70) (-1.73)  
INST_OWN  0.007 ** 0.0074 ** 0.0071 **   (2.37) (2.41) (2.35)  
AFSTD  -0.0608 -0.0595 -0.0634    (-1.43) (-1.39) (-1.48)  
SPECIAL  -0.0027 ** -0.003 ** -0.003 **   (-2.42) (-2.46) (-2.43)  
4thQTR  0.0018 * 0.0020 * 0.0018 *   (1.72) (1.83) (1.70)  
RESPONSIVE  0.0019 0.0020 0.0019    (1.51) (1.53) (1.47)  
BNEWS  -0.0065 *** -0.0065 *** -0.0066 *** 
  (-4.11) (-4.11) (-4.13)   
FWDLOOK(Present)  -0.0004 -0.0004 -0.0004    (-1.41) (-1.41) (-1.41)  
FWDLOOK(Response)  -0.0006 -0.0006 -0.0006    (-1.43) (-1.44) (-1.44)  
POSTONE(Present)  -0.0003 -0.0003 -0.0003    (-1.04) (-1.06) (-1.05)   
POSTONE(Response)  0.0005 * 0.0005 * 0.0006 *   (1.82) (1.75) (1.82)   
NEGTONE(Present)  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000    (0.16) (0.11) (0.14)   
NEGTONE(Response)  0.0003 0.0003 0.0002    (0.77) (0.76) (0.74)   
GUIDANCE  -0.0015 -0.0014 -0.0014  
  (-1.08) (-1.06) (-1.06)   
Firm FE  YES YES YESNo. Obs.   29,103  29,103  29,103  Adj R2   6.438% 6.487% 6.467%  
Notes: Table 5 presents results from estimating the relation between the stock returns to the conference calls and the latent components of 
linguistic complexity. All the variables are as defined in Appendix. t-statistics appear in parentheses and are based on standard errors 
clustered by firm and disclosure date of the conference call. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels 
(two-tail), respectively.  
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Table 6 
Linguistic Complexity and Post Conference Call Returns and Analyst Forecasts 
 
Panel A: Linguistic Complexity and Post Conference Call Returns  
    Dependent Variable = POST_CAR 
Interaction terms  
 
II_DA MBE 
Variable Exp.Sign (1) (2) (3)
Obfu(Present) ? -0.0012 -0.0002 -0.0011 
  (-1.39) (-0.2) (-1.29) 
Obfu(Response) ? 0.0000 -0.0006 -0.0003 
  (-0.03) (-0.59) (-0.39) 
Info(Both) + 0.0053 *** 0.0031 * 0.0042 *** 
  (3.87) (1.85) (3.01) 
Obfu(Present) * EM ?  -0.0025 * -0.0011 
  
 (-1.72) (-0.44) 
Obfu(Response) * EM ?  0.0015 0.0027 
  
 (1.03) (1.34) 
Info(Both) * EM +  0.0063 ** 0.0104 *** 
  
 (2.26) (2.58) 
II_DA  
 -0.0009
  (-0.40)
MBE  0.0080 **
  (2.08)
DSUE  0.0984 *** 0.0981 *** 0.0985 ***
  (14.00) (13.98) (14.04)ΔLEPS  0.0204 0.0210 0.0222  (0.19) (0.19) (0.21)
SIZE  0.0037 *** 0.0037 *** 0.0038 ***  (3.32) (3.38) (3.41)
BM  0.0107 ** 0.0109 ** 0.0112 ***  (2.49) (2.52) (2.60)
RET_VOL  1.3852 *** 1.3894 *** 1.3915 ***  (8.55) (8.66) (8.61)
RET_MOM  -0.0177 ** -0.0177 ** -0.0178 **  (-2.03) (-2.04) (-2.06)
AFN  -0.0005 *** -0.0005 *** -0.0005 ***  (-4.20) (-4.27) (-4.14)
INST_OWN    0.0038  0.0037 0.0042  (0.57) (0.56) (0.65)
AFSTD  -0.4213 *** -0.4218 *** -0.4105 ***  (-3.81) (-3.82) (-3.73)
SPECIAL  -0.0054 ** -0.0055 ** -0.0054 **  (-2.45) (-2.47) (-2.44)
4thQTR  0.0046 ** 0.0047 ** 0.0047 **  (1.99) (2.05) (2.06)
RESPONSIVE  0.0029 0.0028 0.0030  (1.08) (1.04) (1.13)
BNEWS  0.0022 0.0022 0.0022  (0.59) (0.57) (0.59)
FWDLOOK(Present)  -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001  (-0.25) (-0.22) (-0.23)
FWDLOOK(Response)  -0.0008 -0.0007 -0.0007  (-1.00) (-0.98) (-0.98)
POSTONE(Present)  0.0005 0.0005 0.0005  (0.97) (0.96) (1.01)
POSTONE(Response)  -0.0006 -0.0006 -0.0005  (-1.00) (-1.03) (-0.95)
NEGTONE(Present)  0.0006 0.0006 0.0006  (1.19) (1.197) (1.20)
NEGTONE(Response)  -0.0004 -0.0005 -0.0004  (-0.56) (-0.62) (-0.61)
GUIDANCE  -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0003  (-0.10) (-0.11) (-0.14)
Firm FE  YES YES YES   No. Obs.     29,225  29,225 29,225 
Adj R2   5.277% 5.312% 5.335%
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 Table 6 
Linguistic Complexity and Post Conference Call Returns and Analyst Forecasts 
 
Panel B: Market Reactions to Initial Analyst Forecasts and Linguistic Complexity 
 DV = CAR_AnalystReport Interaction terms   II_DA MBE 
Variable (1)   (2) (3)
Obfu(Present) -0.0001  0.0001 -0.0001 
 (-0.57) (0.36) (-0.41) 
Obfu(Response) -0.0002 -0.0003 -0.0003 
 (-1.19) (-1.17) (-1.41) 
Info(Both) 0.0013 *** 0.0008 * 0.0012 *** 
 (3.57) 
 (1.81) (2.97) 
Obfu(Present) * EM 
 -0.0005 -0.0003 
 
  (-1.41) (-0.63) 
Obfu(Response) * EM 
 0.0002 0.0007 
 
  (0.37) (1.29) 
Info(Both) * EM 
  0.0013 * 0.0020 *    (1.83) (1.89) 
II_DA 
  -0.0002
 (-0.27)
MBE -0.0001 (-0.17)
DSUE 0.0037 ** 0.0037 ** 0.0037 **
 (2.02) (1.99) (2.00)ΔLEPS 0.0478 * 0.0478 * 0.0479 * (1.92) (1.92) (1.92)
SIZE -0.0001 0.0000 -0.0001 (-0.22) (-0.16) (-0.24)
BM -0.0003  -0.0002 -0.0003 (-0.22)  (-0.20) (-0.22)
RET_VOL 0.0860 * 0.0871 * 0.0856 * (1.75)  (1.76) (1.74)
RET_MOM -0.0031  -0.0031 -0.0031 (-1.46)  (-1.46) (-1.47)
AFN 0.0000 * 0.0000 ** 0.0000 ** (-1.94)  (-1.97) (-1.96)
INST_OWN -0.0012  -0.0012 -0.0012 (-0.74)  (-0.75) (-0.73)
AFSTD -0.0543  -0.0544 -0.0543 (-1.58)  (-1.58) (-1.57)
SPECIAL -0.0003  -0.0004 -0.0003 (-0.61)  (-0.64) (-0.61)
4thQTR 0.0004  0.0005 0.0004 (0.69)  (0.75) (0.71)
RESPONSIVE -0.0009  -0.0010 -0.0009 (-1.16)  (-1.19) (-1.17)
BNEWS -0.0008  -0.0008 -0.0008
 (-0.86)  (-0.88) (-0.88)
FWDLOOK(Present) 0.0000  0.0000 0.0000 (-0.14)  (-0.11) (-0.12)
FWDLOOK(Response) -0.0003  -0.0003 -0.0003 (-1.38)  (-1.36) (-1.38)
POSTONE(Present) 0.0000  0.0000 0.0000 (0.07)  (0.05) (0.08)
POSTONE(Response) 0.0001  0.0001 0.0001 (0.65)   (0.64) (0.69)
NEGTONE(Present) 0.0000  0.0000 0.0000 (0.33)  (0.31) (0.33)
NEGTONE(Response) 0.0001  0.0001 0.0001 (0.71)  (0.65) (0.68)
GUIDANCE 0.0002  0.0002 0.0002
 (0.30)   (0.30) (0.29)
Firm FE YES  YES YES
No.Obs.        21,344          21,344      21,344 
Adj R2 1.410%   1.435% 1.428%
Notes: Table 6 presents results from estimating the relation between the latent components of linguistic complexity and the market reactions 
to the first analyst reports. All the variables are as defined in Appendix. t-statistics appear in parentheses and are based on standard errors 
clustered by firm and disclosure date of the conference call. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels 
(two-tail), respectively. 
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Table 7 
Linguistic Complexity and Management Forecast Precision 
 
    Dependent Variable = MGMT_PRECISION 
Interaction terms  
 
II_DA MBE 
Variable Exp.Sign (1) (2) (3)
Obfu(Present) − 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
  (0.66) (0.62) (0.37) 
Obfu(Response) − -0.0001 ** -0.0001 ** -0.0001 * 
  (-2.53) (-2.09) (-1.83) 
Info(Both) + 0.0001 ** 0.0002 *** 0.0001 ** 
 
 (2.31) (2.66) (2.23) 
Obfu(Present) * EM −  0.0000 0.0001 
   (-0.26) (1.11) 
Obfu(Response) * EM −  0.0000 -0.0002 ** 
   (-0.27) (-2.22) 
Info(Both) * EM +  -0.0002 -0.0001    (-1.39) (-0.45) 
II_DA   -0.0001
   (-0.66)
MBE   0.000 ***   (3.47)
DSUE  -0.0007 * -0.001 * -0.001 *
  (-1.91) (-1.90) (-1.82)ΔLEPS  -0.007 -0.007 -0.007  (-0.77) (-0.77) (-0.72)
SIZE  0.0001 ** 0.0001 ** 0.0001 **  (2.23) (2.24) (2.36)
BM  -0.004 *** -0.0039 *** -0.0039 ***  (-12.87) (-12.73) (-12.84)
RET_VOL  -0.078 *** -0.078 *** -0.078 ***  (-7.77) (-7.82) (-7.80)
RET_MOM  0.0036 *** 0.0036 *** 0.0036 ***  (7.73) (7.78) (7.90)
AFN  0.0000 ** 0.0000 * 0.0000 **  (1.98) (1.96) (1.97)
INST_OWN  0.001 ** 0.0010 ** 0.0010 ***  (2.45) (2.52) (2.59)
AFSTD  -0.1221 *** -0.1219 *** -0.1211 ***  (-5.80) (-5.79) (-5.76)
SPECIAL  0.0000 0.000 0.000  (-0.14) (-0.15) (-0.06)
4thQTR  -0.0009 *** -0.0009 *** -0.0009 ***  (-6.25) (-6.26) (-6.24)
RESPONSIVE  -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001  (-0.47) (-0.46) (-0.42)
BNEWS  -0.0007 *** -0.0007 *** -0.0006 ***
  (-4.66) (-4.68) (-4.62)
FWDLOOK(Present)  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000  (0.78) (0.82) (0.80)
FWDLOOK(Response) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000  (0.21) (0.23) (0.17)
POSTONE(Present)  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000  (-1.59) (-1.58) (-1.59)
POSTONE(Response)  0.0000 * 0.0000 * 0.0000 *  (1.78) (1.77) (1.84)
NEGTONE(Present)  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000  (0.14) (0.12) (0.07)
NEGTONE(Response)  -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001  (-1.52) (-1.53) (-1.51)
GUIDANCE  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
  (0.30) (0.31) (0.31)
Firm FE  YES YES YES 
      
No.Obs.      8,035  8,035  8,035 Adj R2   27.39% 27.42% 27.53%
Notes: Table7 presents results from estimating the relation between the latent components of linguistic complexity and the management forecast 
precision. All the variables are as defined in Appendix. t-statistics appear in parentheses and are based on standard errors clustered by firm and 
disclosure date of the conference call. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels (two-tail), respectively. 
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Table 8 
Linguistic Complexity and Analyst Forecast Accuracy and Dispersion 
 
Panel A: Linguistic Complexity and Analyst Forecast Accuracy  
  Dependent Variable = ΔAF_ACCR   
Interaction terms    II_DA MBE Variable Exp.Sign (1) (2) (3)
Obfu(Present) − -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001
  (-1.38) (-1.10) (-1.22)
Obfu(Response) − -0.0001 *** -0.0001 -0.0001 **
  (-2.61) (-1.09) (-2.45)
Info(Both) + 0.0002 ** 0.0001 0.0002 
  (2.16) (0.65) (1.56)
Obfu(Present) * EM −   0.0000 -0.0002 
  (-0.52) (-1.55)
Obfu(Response) * EM −   -0.0002 0.0000 
  (-1.56) (0.39)
Info(Both) * EM +   0.0004 * 0.0004 **
  (1.94) (2.54)
II_DA -0.0001
 (-0.64)
MBE 0.0001
 (0.82)
UESURP -0.0492 *** -0.0495 *** -0.0490 *** (-6.93) (-7.12) (-7.01)
AFSTD 0.0645 *** 0.0638 *** 0.0646 *** (4.16) (4.09) (4.14)
CAR -0.0041 *** -0.0043 *** -0.0043 *** (-2.61) (-2.90) (-2.93)
ΔLEPS 0.0170 0.0191 * 0.0190 * (1.56) (1.74) (1.72)
RET 0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 (0.21) (0.05) (0.06)
SIZE 0.0001 0.0000 0.0001 (0.95) (0.65) (0.73)
LMB -0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 (-0.13) (0.28) (0.25)
AFN 0.0000 *** 0.0000 *** 0.0000 *** (-4.62) (-4.30) (-4.29)
INST_OWN -0.0002 0.0000 -0.0001
 
 (-0.40) (-0.03) (-0.13)
LOSS  0.0002 0.0003 0.0003
  (0.51) (1.05) (0.99)
R&D  -0.0005 -0.0005 -0.0005
  (-1.24) (-1.21) (-1.31)
FWDLOOK(Present) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
 (-0.66) (-0.19) (-0.11)
FWDLOOK(Response) -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001
 (-0.96) (-0.97) (-0.99)
POSTONE(Present) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
 (-0.94) (-0.70) (-0.80)
POSTONE(Response) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
 (0.90) (0.45) (0.57)
NEGTONE(Present) -0.0001 ** -0.0001 *** -0.0001 ***
 (-2.49) (-2.93) (-2.96)
NEGTONE(Response) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
 (0.03) (0.17) (0.20)
GUIDANCE -0.0003 -0.0003 ** -0.0003 **
  (-1.56) (-1.99) (-1.98)
Firm FE  YES  YES YES No. Obs.    29,656   29,656 29,656 
Adj R2   3.514% 4.555% 4.675%
Notes: Table 7 presents results from estimating the relation between the change in analyst forecast accuracy and the latent components of 
linguistic complexity. All the variables are as defined in Appendix. t-statistics appear in parentheses and are based on standard errors 
clustered by firm and disclosure date of the conference call. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels 
(two-tail), respectively.  
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Table 8 
Linguistic Complexity and Analyst Forecast Accuracy and Dispersion  
 
Panel B: Linguistic Complexity and Analyst Forecast Dispersion 
    Dependent Variable = ΔAF_DISP 
Interaction terms    II_DA MBE 
Variable Exp.Sign (1)  (2)   (3)   
Obfu(Present) + 0.0014 * 0.0004 0.0016 **
  (1.89) (0.44) (1.97)
Obfu(Response) + 0.0015 ** 0.0016 * 0.0013 *
  (2.19)  (1.92)  (1.75)  
Info(Both) − -0.0031 ** -0.0013 -0.0026 *
  (-2.41)  (-0.90)  (-1.90)  
Obfu(Present) * EM + 0.0028 ** -0.0018
    (2.21)  (-1.53)  
Obfu(Response) * EM + 0.0000 0.0025 *
    (-0.02) (1.91) 
Info(Both) * EM − -0.0052 * -0.0054 **
    (-1.89) (-2.38) 
II_DA  0.0024
    (1.11) 
MBE  -0.0019
  (-0.93)
UESURP  0.0075 0.014 0.007
  (0.10) (0.18) (0.10)
CAR  0.0025 0.0034 0.0024
  (0.15) (0.21) (0.15)ΔLEPS  0.2540 ** 0.2417 ** 0.2534 **
  (2.14) (2.06) (2.14)
RET  0.0008 0.0007 0.0008
  (0.25) (0.20) (0.25)
SIZE  0.0005 0.0005 0.0005
  (0.53) (0.58) (0.50)
BM  0.0102 ** 0.0096 ** 0.0101 **
  (2.21) (2.07) (2.18)
AFN  0.0002 ** 0.0002 ** 0.0002 **
  (2.33) (2.19) (2.33)
INST_OWN  0.0043 0.0039 0.0042
  (0.72) (0.66) (0.71)
LOSS  0.0108 ** 0.0100 ** 0.0107 **
  (2.49) (2.33) (2.46)
R&D  0.0110 ** 0.0110 ** 0.0112 **
  (2.22) (2.27) (2.26)
FWDLOOK(Present) -0.0001 -0.0003 -0.0002
 (-0.31) (-0.54) (-0.33)
FWDLOOK(Response) 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 
 (0.16) (0.09) (0.15)
POSTONE(Present) -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001
 (-0.13) (-0.17) (-0.15)
POSTONE(Response) -0.0008 -0.0007 -0.0008
 (-1.23) (-1.06) (-1.22)
NEGTONE(Present) 0.0010 * 0.0010 ** 0.0010 *
 (1.92) (2.03) (1.95)
NEGTONE(Response) 0.0004 0.0004 0.0004
 (0.46) (0.53) (0.48)
GUIDANCE 0.0108 *** 0.0110 *** 0.0108 ***
  (4.43) (4.53) (4.43)
Firm FE  YES  YES YES No. Obs.    21,224 21,224 21,224 
Adj R2   1.469% 1.225% 1.485%
Notes: Table 8 presents results from estimating the relation between the change in analyst forecast dispersion and the latent 
components of linguistic complexity. All the variables are as defined in Appendix. t-statistics appear in parentheses and are based 
on standard errors clustered by firm and disclosure date of the conference call. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 
0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels (two-tail), respectively. 
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Table 9 
Linguistic Complexity and Changes in Institutional Ownership  
 
Panel A: Changes in Institutional Ownership and Linguistic Complexity     Dependent Variable = ΔINST_OWN 
Interaction terms  
 
II_DA MBE 
Variable Exp.Sign (1) (2) (3)
Obfu(Present) − -0.0010 ** -0.0007 -0.0008 
  (-2.01) (-1.11) (-1.47)
Obfu(Response) − -0.0006 -0.0003 -0.0006 
  (-1.26) (-0.59) (-1.24)
Info(Both) + 0.0031 *** 0.0024 *** 0.0033 ***   (4.05) (2.62) (4.13)
Obfu(Present) * EM − -0.0010 -0.0022 * 
  (-1.01) (-1.69)
Obfu(Response) * EM − -0.0007 0.0002 
  (-0.78) (0.18)
Info(Both) * EM + 0.0019 -0.0019   (1.19) (-0.82)
II_DA  -0.002 *
  (-1.66)
MBE  -0.0011
  (-0.57)
AF_REV   0.1739 *** 0.1731 *** 0.1740 ***
    (3.17)  (3.16)  (3.18)  
POST_CAR  0.0279 *** 0.028 *** 0.0279 ***
  (6.10)  (6.05)  (6.11)  
UESURP  0.1301 *** 0.131 *** 0.1301 ***  (4.72) (4.74) (4.72)
AFSTD  -0.1226 ** -0.1227 ** -0.1240 **  (-2.28) (-2.28) (-2.3)
CAR  0.0391 *** 0.0390 *** 0.0391 ***  (4.08) (4.05) (4.08)
ΔLEPS  0.1410 *** 0.1433 *** 0.1410 ***  (3.14) (3.19) (3.14)
RET  0.0048 ** 0.0049 ** 0.0049 **  (2.46) (2.45) (2.5)
SIZE  -0.0017 *** -0.0017 *** -0.0017 ***  (-2.9) (-2.83) (-2.93)
BM  -0.0039 -0.0035 -0.0039  (-1.24) (-1.12) (-1.27)
AFN  0.0003 *** 0.0003 *** 0.0003 ***  (4.3) (4.33) (4.31)
LEV  0.0031 0.0031 0.0030  (0.74) (0.74) (0.71)
EPRATIO  0.0131 0.0138 0.0131  (1.48) (1.55) (1.48)
FWDLOOK(Present)  -0.0003 -0.0003 -0.0003  (-1.00) (-0.95) (-1.00)
FWDLOOK(Response)  0.0025 *** 0.0025 *** 0.0025 ***  (4.95) (4.98) (4.94)
POSTONE(Present)  -0.0004 -0.0004 -0.0004  (-1.53) (-1.52) (-1.54)
POSTONE(Response)  0.0020 *** 0.0019 *** 0.0020 ***  (5.00) (4.90) (5.00)
NEGTONE(Present)  0.0001 0.0001 0.0001  (0.46) (0.41) (0.47)
NEGTONE(Response)  -0.0003 0.000 -0.0003  (-0.73) (-0.76) (-0.72)
GUIDANCE  -0.0001 0.000 -0.0001  (-0.08) (-0.06) (-0.07)
Firm FE  YES YES YES 
No. Obs.   27,233 27,233 27,233   
Adj R2   2.77% 2.80% 2.783%   
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Table 9 
Linguistic Complexity and Changes in Institutional Ownership  
 
Panel B: Changes in Institutional Ownership and Linguistic Complexity for TRA vs. QIX vs. DED 
    Dependent Variable = ΔINST_TRA_QIX_DED 
Interaction terms  TRA QIX DED 
Variable Exp.Sign (1)   (2)   (3)   
Obfu(Present) − -0.0007 ** -0.0002 -0.0001 
 (-2.00) (-0.66) (-0.69) 
Obfu(Response) − -0.0007 ** 0.0000 -0.0002 
 
 (-2.05) (-0.09) (-1.21) 
Info(Both) + 0.0013 ** 0.0009 0.0003   (2.07) (1.62) (0.96) 
UESURP 
 0.1686 *** 0.0322 -0.0265   (8.99) (1.35) (-1.45) 
AFSTD 
 -0.0280 -0.1266 *** 0.0023 
  (-0.77) (-2.98) (0.09) 
CAR 0.0506 *** -0.0058 -0.0204 *** (6.58) (-0.85) (-5.81) 
ΔLEPS 0.1564 *** 0.0434 -0.0487 ** (4.84) (1.23) (-2.14) 
RET -0.0014 0.0074 *** -0.0026 *** (-0.97) (5.36) (-3.34) 
SIZE -0.0003 -0.0012 *** -0.0004 ** (-0.83) (-3.21) (-2.14) 
BM 0.0119 *** -0.0158 ** -0.0001  (5.49) (-7.76) (-0.09) 
AFN 0.0001 *** 0.0001 0.0001 *** (2.95) (2.04) (2.94) 
LEV 0.0056 * 0.0002 -0.0052 *** (1.85) (0.05) (-2.60) 
EPRATIO 0.0039 0.0166 0.0018 
 (0.55) (1.22) (0.12) 
FWDLOOK(Present) -0.0002 0.0000 0.0000 
  (-0.94) (-0.18) (0.58) 
FWDLOOK(Response) 
 0.0026 *** 0.0007 ** -0.0003 * (7.49) (2.02) (-1.92) 
POSTONE(Present) -0.0002 0.0000 0.0000 
 (-0.91) (0.07) (0.22) 
POSTONE(Response) 0.0014 *** 0.0007 *** 0.0000  (5.12) (2.88) (0.02) 
NEGTONE(Present) 0.0000 0.0001 -0.0001 
 (0.03) (0.78) (-0.67) 
NEGTONE(Response) -0.0004 0.0000 0.0002 
 (-1.24) (0.13) (1.30) 
GUIDANCE 0.0011 -0.0013   0.0000 
 (1.12) (-1.39) (0.01) 
Firm FE YES YES YES 
 
No. Obs.       27,395       27,641       18,099 
Adj R2   2.994%   1.538%   1.147% 
Notes: Table 9 presents results from estimating the relation between the changes in institutional ownership and the latent components of 
linguistic complexity. All the variables are as defined in Appendix. t-statistics appear in parentheses and are based on standard errors clustered by 
firm and disclosure date of the conference call. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels (two-tail), 
respectively. 
